Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When by Guiora, Amos N.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 3 Fall 2008 Article 2
Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who,
What, When
Amos N. Guiora
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guiora, Amos N. (2008) "Self-Defense - From the Wild West to 9/11: Who, What, When," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 41:
Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol41/iss3/2
Self-Defense-From the Wild West
to 9/11: Who, What, When'
Amos N. Guioratt
Introduction ..................................................... 632
A. Background ........................................... 632
B. Historical Analogies ................................... 637
I. The Need for Information ................................ 638
A. Invasion of Privacy .................................... 642
B. Limits of Intelligence-Limits of Power ................. 644
II. Self-Defense and the Wild West .......................... 645
A. Pat Garrett and the Death of Billy the Kid ............ 646
B. Wyatt Earp and the Gunfight at the O.K. Corral ....... 647
III. U.S. Constitutional Law .................................. 649
IV. U.S. Criminal Law ....................................... 650
A . D efinition ............................................ 651
B. Im m inence ........................................... 652
C . Reasonableness ....................................... 653
V. International Law and Self-Defense ....................... 654
A. The Caroline Doctrine ................................. 657
B. UN Charter: Article 51 ................................ 658
C. UN Security Council Resolutions Post-9/11 ............ 661
VI. Strict-Scrutiny Standard .................................. 663
A. A Past Failure ......................................... 664
B. The Need to Objectify Counterterrorism ............... 665
C . The Legs ............................................. 667
D. The Answer: FISA ..................................... 672
C onclusion ...................................................... 673
t Portions of this article originally printed in Anticipatory Self-Defence and
International Law-A Re-Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3 (2008), available at
http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/13/1/3.
Tt Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I would like
to thank my good friend and generous colleague, Professor Andrew P. Morriss for
suggesting a possible connection between the Wild West and terrorism and then for so
graciously assisting in the early stages of my research; participants at the United States
Military Academy Conference on the "Rule of Law in Armed Conflict;" faculty and
students at The John Marshall College of Law; students at The University of
Pennsylvania School of Law; participants at the Lewis and Clark Law School faculty
workshop; faculty and students at Rutgers-Camden who attended my talk sponsored by
the International Law Society; Anne Hollander for preliminary research assistance; and
Artemis Vamianakis (candidate for J.D., S.J. Quinney College of Law, 2009) for her
invaluable research and editing contributions.
41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631 (2008)
Cornell International Law Journal
"Rhetoric is a poor substitute for action, and we have trusted only to
rhetoric. If we are really to be a great nation, we must not merely talk; we
must act big.'
"[D]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife. " 2
Introduction
The above quotations reflect important tensions inherent in self-
defense-how does the United States "act big;" and is "detached reflection"
truly possible in the face of a potential attack? For the past six years, much
of the Bush Administration's operational counterterrorism has been largely
ineffective. In addition, serious questions have been raised as to whether
or not a counterterrorism strategy has been developed since the attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Counterterrorism tactics must not be confused with counterterrorism
strategy. For example, the question of whether a suspected terrorist is
killed is tactical. Alternatively, strategic questions include why that indi-
vidual was targeted, what is the long term significance of his death, and
what threat did he present. Institutionalized, legal-based process is of para-
mount importance in developing a counterterrorism strategy. The gather-
ing and analysis of intelligence information is the essence of operational
counterterrorism. Checks and balances and the doctrine of separation of
powers are the essence of the American constitutional paradigm and pro-
tect against an unfettered executive. The paradigm this article proposes
articulates a confluence between intelligence gathering, making that intelli-
gence operational, and the checks required on the executive to ensure the
legality of the President's decisions.
A. Background
One of the most important questions post-9/11 is how a nation-state
defends itself against an unseen enemy. 3 This article will focus on how a
nation-state that believes in the rule of law and morality in armed conflict
prevents attacks against its innocent citizens. Self-defense, or active pre-
emptive self-defense, 4 against the unseen enemy is extraordinarily difficult
and fraught with enormous risks and dangers. 5 How and when a nation-
state defends itself against such an enemy is not only critical to address,
but it is the combat of the future. In the context of post-9/11 operational
1. Theodore Roosevelt, METROPOLITAN, Sept. 1917, at 21.
2. Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J. L. EcON. & POL'Y 187, 205 (2006) (citing
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921)).
3. See Stephen W. Dummer, Comment, Secure Flight and Dataveillance, A New Type
of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your Rights When You Don't Even Know It, 75 Miss. LJ.
583, 612 (2006).
4. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for definitions of self-defense.
5. See Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 319, 324 (2004) [hereinafter Targeted Killing].
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counterterrorism, the question is whether self-defense, as presently articu-
lated by international law, enables the United States to act preventively in
an effective way. This article will address this issue in an interdisciplinary
manner, analyzing American criminal and constitutional law, as well as
international law. This analysis will enable policy and decisionmakers,
academics, the general public, and military commanders to develop and
implement a definition of self-defense relevant to post-9/11 conflicts.
An introduction of this nature invariably raises the question of
whether there is a need for another article on this subject. Although case
law addressing6 and literature discussing7 self-defense are boundless and
impressive, this article, through an interdisciplinary analysis of self-
defense, articulates a new process-based self-defense standard predicated
on a historical analogy to the Wild West. This article also proposes
expanding substantive procedural measures between the U.S. judicial and
executive branches in operational counterterrorism.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, taught decisionmakers and com-
manders alike that in future military conflicts, nation-states will usually
confront non-state actors, rather than other nation-states. 8 The traditional
state versus state war as understood by the "founding fathers" of interna-
tional law is largely a historical relic.9 Given this change in the nature of
the conflict, the events of 9/11 clearly suggest the need to re-articulate
international law.10
6. For case law regarding self-defense-including international, federal, and state
cases-see, for example, Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) ("Detached
reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of uplifted knife."); Beard v. United
States, 158 U.S. 550, 563-64 (1895) (no duty to retreat before using deadly force); State
v. Hogan, 764 A.2d 1012, 1026-27 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (justification
defenses are not available in a prosecution where recklessness or negligence suffices to
establish the requisite culpability state); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 46-48 (N.Y.
1986) (reasonableness means that defendant has requisite belief that deadly force is
necessary and that such belief is reasonable); Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 l.CJ, 116 (Dec. 19).
7. See, e.g., Mary Ellen McConnell & Maria Alevras-Chen, The Ban on the Bomb-
and Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV.
497 (2007); Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defense, Anticipatory Self-Defense and Pre-emption: Inter-
national Law's Response to Terrorism, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 95 (2007).
8. See D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter?,
80 TEMP. L. REv. 245, 288 (2007) (reviewing PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: How THE IMPE-
RIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTITUTION (2005) and JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR
AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005)) (stating that "the
enemies in the war on terror are often nonstate actors").
9. See Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-
Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV. 123, 127 (2003). Hugo Grotius is known as one of the found-
ing fathers of international law. See Oscar Schachter, The Role of Power in International
Law, 93 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 200, 200 (1999). Grotius wrote on the rules of interna-
tional law that determine when one state can use force against another state. Martinez,
supra, at 127.
10. For examples of articles emphasizing the need to re-articulate self-defense in
international law see Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A
Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25 (1988);
Mikael Nabati, International Law at a Crossroads: Self-Defense, Global Terrorism, and Pre-
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In the debate regarding the re-articulation of international law, the
question to be addressed is how the nation-state should defend itself-
preemptively-against an unseen enemy. In the traditional war paradigm,
nation-states defend themselves against either armies massing on their bor-
ders or an attack by another nation-state. Self-defense in the "unseen
enemy" paradigm is ambiguous. It is not inherently clear who is attacking
the state or against whom the state is protecting itself.i" It is this issue that
has significantly affected the self-defense discussion. 12
Determining the extent of self-defense is critical in examining the rela-
tionship between international law and counterterrorism.13 Unlike tradi-
tional warfare during which militaries face off with planes, tanks, and
warships, counterterrorism is characterized by an often unseen enemy and
the battles take place in "back alleys with dark shadows." 1 4 Self-defense in
this environment is enormously complicated. The decision to preemp-
tively attack a highly elusive target, often near civilians, is based almost
exclusively on intelligence information. 15
This article's fundamental argument is that existing international law
does not provide sufficiently clear guidelines to nation-state deci-
sionmakers regarding when to take preemptive 16 or anticipatory action 17
emption (A Call to Rethink the Self-Defense Normative Framework), 13 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 771 (2003).
11. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War
on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 348 (2002); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2047, 2066 (2005).
12. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 2079.
13. Targeted Killing, supra note 5, at 323; see also Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic
Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the United States, Israel, and India, 33
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 285, 303 (2005).
14. Amos N. Guiora, Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing Competing
Interests in Counter-Terrorism, 20 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 363, 393 (2006).
15. Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 737, 747-48 (2004); see also David D. Caron, The Rule-Outcome Paradox,
Madness Cascades and the Fog of Preemption: Seeking the 'Best Rule' for Use of Force, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 481, 492-95 (2004); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page,
The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427,
428 (2006) [hereinafter Unholy Trinity].
16. Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New Paradigm" of
International Law?, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 93-94 (2006). Preemptive self-defense
allows for reaction when a serious threat to national security exists. Id. This interpreta-
tion expands the notion of imminence. Id. The National Security Strategy of the United
States adopted this articulation of self-defense. See generally WHITE HOUSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE 133 (2d ed. 2004); W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past
and Future Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (2006); Abraham D.
Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209 (2003); Michael J. Glen-
non, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan.
28, 2002, at 24.
17. The UN Security Council supports an interpretation of anticipatory self-defense
that allows for reaction if an attack is "imminent, no other means would deflect it and
the action is proportionate." Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 9 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
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against a non-state actor. It is proposed that the Caroline Doctrine,18 UN
Charter Article 51,19 and the post-9/11 Security Council Resolutions
136820 and 1373,21 are insufficient to enable the nation-state to act early
enough, provided intelligence is available.
How the nation-state-under the rubric of the rule of law and morality
in armed conflict-protects itself by acting before an attack is a question of
enormous significance. 22 In answering this question, guidelines and crite-
ria that regulate if and when a nation-state may take anticipatory action are
critical.2 3 The creation of guidelines does not suggest that the nation-state
may not act-it is quite the opposite. It does, however, forcefully advocate
that the underlying reasons for state action must be sound, legal, and
moral. By examining international, criminal, and constitutional law, this
article seeks to do just that.
This article proposes a new, process-based, strict-scrutiny approach to
preemptive self-defense against non-state actors. 24 This strict-scrutiny
approach would allow a nation-state to act against a non-state actor earlier
than allowed under existing international law; however, the act must be
based on reliable, viable, valid, and corroborated intelligence. A court of
law will decide if the intelligence passes the strict-scrutiny standard, which
is comparable to admissibility requirements of the criminal law paradigm.
The court of law that this article proposes is not a vague concept. To mini-
mize intelligence-based counterterrorism mistakes, this article proposes
that the Executive branch submit the intelligence that is relevant to the spe-
cific counterterrorism operation to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISA Court).2 5 Although this proposal suggests a curtailing of
Executive power, in essence it is philosophically akin to the FISA Court's
issuance of a wiretapping warrant in response to an executive branch
request.2
6
(Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf. For further dis-
cussion see D.W. BowE-r, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-89 (1958); ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 230-36 (1986); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 183-85 (3d ed. 2001); RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 100-03 (1989), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/erickson.pdf; Jutta Brunn& & Stephen J.
Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq, 53 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 785 (2004);
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984);
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 559 (1999).
18. David B. Rivkin Jr., et al., Remember the Caroline!: The Doctrine of 'Anticipatory
Self-defense'- More Relevant Than Ever, NAT'L REV., Jul. 1, 2002, at 17.
19. U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
21. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
22. CASSESE, supra note 17, at 234-36; GRAY, supra note 16, at 218.
23. Targeted Killing, supra note 5, at 324.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (2000).
26. For a discussion of this issue, see Andrew Ayers, Note, The Police Can Do What?
Making Local Governmental Entities Pay for Unauthorized Wiretapping, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 651 (2003); Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire:
Assessing the Constitutionality of the National Security Agency's Warrantless Wiretapping
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Self-defense-whether personal or state-is a universal concept;2 7
however, this article analyzes the concept from an American perspective.
To that end, the analysis will focus on American criminal and constitu-
tional law and how they affect the American interpretation of international
law. This article does not propose an internationalization of the American
process, but rather the articulation of an American standard for an Ameri-
can process. The interdisciplinary approach this article adopts, however,
establishes a paradigm that may be relevant to other civil, democratic
regimes. 28
The interdisciplinary legal analysis of self-defense in the post-9/11
world will be augmented by historical analogy 2 9 to the American Wild
West.30 This analogy does not suggest that operational counterterrorism
is akin to the Wild West-President Bush is not Wyatt Earp, 3 1 and Osama
bin Laden is not Jesse James. 32 Furthermore, it does not imply that Ameri-
can forces in Iraq are the vigilantes in Montana3 3 seeking to protect narrow
interests. However, the Wild West analogy assists us in analyzing two criti-
cal issues: the limits of self-defense and the criteria for determining when it
Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429 (2006); Louis A. Chiarella
& Michael A. Newton, "So Judge, How Do I Get That FISA Warrant?": The Policy and
Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance, ARMY LAW., Oct. 1997, at 25, 25; Brian
R. Decker, Comment, "The War of Information": The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and the President's Warrantless-Wiretapping Program, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 291 (2006); Recent Case, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
Holds that Prosecutors May Spy on American Agents of Foreign Powers Without a Warrant-
In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2246 (2003); Evan Tsen Lee, The
Legality of the NSA Wiretapping Program,12 TEX. J. CL. & C.R. 1 (2006); This Call May
Be Monitored: Is NSA Wiretapping Legal?, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1671 (2006).
27. GRAY, supra note 16, at 115-19.
28. See Bhoumik, supra note 13, at 303.
29. See also Amos N. GuioRA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION,
(forthcoming 2008); Amos N. Guiora, Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a
Boot?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 375 (2008) (using the historical analogy approach to
address a post-9/11 issue in examining the "limits of interrogation" through the lens of
the interrogations that African-Americans were subjected to in the American Deep South
in the 1930's and 1940's).
30. The Regulators, The History of the Wild West, http://www.theregulaters.co.uk/
page6.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). The Wild West "is comprised of the history,
myths, legends, stories, and beliefs that collected around the Western United States from
1865 to 1890. Most often the term refers to the late 19th century, between the American
Civil War and the 1890 closing of the frontier." Id.
31. Wyatt Earp (1848-1929) is best known for his participation in the Gunfight at
the O.K. Corral. See RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 384 (1992). Earp resided in the American West and
established himself as a lawman unafraid to use force to keep the peace. See id.
32. Jesse James (1847-1882) was an American West outlaw and bandit, known for
robbing and raiding banks, residences, trains, and stagecoaches. See id. at 133-39.
33. In December 1863, a group of citizens in Montana met secretly to form a vigi-
lance committee, an extrajudicial group designed to keep local order. See Andrew P.
Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private
Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 644 (1998). DuringJanuary and Febru-
ary of 1864 the committee executed twenty-two men by hanging, with more to come in
the months and years ahead. See id. at 644-46. None of the executed men had a trial,
an appeal, or a chance to set his affairs in order before being hanged. Id. at 646-48.
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may be invoked. Not every threat justifies self-defense. Those threats that
are justified must be limited by proportionality requirements.
B. Historical Analogies
Historical analogies rarely, if ever, are perfect because no set of events
and circumstances are exactly similar. Nevertheless, sufficient similarities
between the Wild West and the post-9/ 11 world exist to justify the compar-
ison-particularly the need to develop limits to self-defense in an environ-
ment that pitted the nation-state against a variety of perceived, though not
clearly identified, enemies.
The Wild West is relevant to the post-9/11 world because it helps
establish self-defense standards in an amorphous environment. In defend-
ing society, the sheriff of the Wild West acted against those perceived to be
threatening either the existing or the developing civil society.3 4 By examin-
ing the sheriffs actions, this article seeks to propose a new standard of self-
defense. That is, when-and on the basis of what-did the sheriff deter-
mine that he could open fire against a particular individual? Against whom
was the sheriff acting defensively? These questions form the core of this
article. It is important to emphasize-and re-emphasize-that this analogy
does not suggest that the nation-state today is akin to the sheriff of the
past. It does, however, propose that analyzing the sheriff in the Wild West
facilitates the development of a new self-defense standard. With that
caveat addressed, this article may move forward.
In adopting the Wild West as a valid historical analogy, this article's
fundamental aim is to propose a process indicating how nation-states may
defend themselves in the post-9/11 world. Although international law
grants nation-states the right to protect themselves, when that right
becomes operational remains an open question. That is, does the nation-
state have to await attack or can it act preemptively on the basis of intelli-
gence? The answer-akin to the situation in the Wild West-is that pre-
emptive action is lawful, provided the actor has cause to act. How "cause"
is defined is critical to the discussion. If cause is loosely defined, then the
power of the nation-state is best described as literally unlimited. Such a
scenario would threaten the world order for all. 35 Although this situation
may be tempting, it is also illegal and self-destructive. 3 6 Unlimited state
action frequently involves the killing of innocent civilians and could lead to
34. See RICHARD O'CONNOR, PAT GARRETT: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FAMOUS MARSHAL AND
THE KILLER OF BILLY THE KID 8-9 (1960).
35. See David Gray Adler, Protecting the Nation at the Expense of Individuals? Defining
the Scope of U.S. Executive Power at Home and Abroad in Times of Crisis: George Bush and
the Abuse of History: The Constitution and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 144 (2007) (discussing the threat to world stability when
executive feels that it can exercise vast unilateral prerogatives).
36. Id.; see also Saby Ghoshray, Illuminating the Shadows of Constitutional Space
While Tracing the Contours of Presidential War Power, 39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 295 (2008).
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the birth of the next generation of terrorists.3 7 International law, however,
clearly justifies self-defense. 38 What is unclear is when the nation-state
can act.
3 9
The question is, under what circumstances and subject to what condi-
tions can a commander order a military unit to preemptively attack an
identified enemy. The critical variable in this discussion is how "identi-
fied" the enemy has to be. 40 Perhaps the question can best be phrased as
"how certain is certain?" The policy and legal discussions must provide
the commander and decisionmaker with concrete responses to these ques-
tions. Otherwise, not only will the enemy continue to be unseen but the
guidelines will be unseen as well. That combination-in the context of
operational counterterrorism -is unworkable.
A "who, what, when" analysis of preemptive self-defense will enable
the commander and decisionmaker to better understand who the enemy is.
This analysis inherently presupposes that the nation-state may act; it does
not, however, suggest that the nation-state may always act. The proposed
model explicitly involves limits-after all, the essence of the rule of law
paradigm is an inherent limit on state power.4 1 In the self-defense debate,
the critical questions are what are those restraints, when can the nation-
state act, against what target, and who is the enemy. 4 2
This article seeks to answer these questions. Part I scrutinizes the
analysis of intelligence information. Part II examines self-defense in the
Wild West, particularly Billy the Kid and Wyatt Earp. Part III discusses the
foundational principles of the right to self-defense in United States Consti-
tutional Law. Part IV describes the conceptual view of self-defense in
United States Criminal Law. Part V discusses the right to, and the concep-
tual view of, self-defense according to customary international law. Finally,
Part VI presents the proposed strict scrutiny standard.
I. The Need for Information
Self-defense subject to the rule of law requires reliable, viable, valid,
and corroborated intelligence information.43 Otherwise, the actor-an
individual or the state-will be engaged in nothing more than "lashing out"
at an unspecified target4 4 with tragedy around the corner.45 Still, the
37. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, September 11th, a Citizen's Responses (Continued), 4
Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 135, 135 (2006) (stating that "the American invasion and
occupation of Iraq have helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicals").
38. BOwETT, supra note 17, at 187-91.
39. Targeted Killing, supra note 5, at 323-24.
40. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 11, at 349 (discussing the necessity to distinguish
members of Al Qaeda from other "criminal gangs").
41. The retired President of the Israel Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, advocated the
principle of self-imposed restraints. See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 39 (2002).
42. See Targeted Killing, supra note 5, at 325.
43. Schmitt, supra note 15, at 747-48.
44. Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153, 1164 (2002).
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intended-or presumed-victim need not wait to be attacked.4 6 Taking the
offensive to prevent the attack before it has begun is justified.4 7 This offen-
sive requires identifying the threat, the attacker, and the appropriate pro-
portional response. 48 The threat must be deemed legitimate, however, to
justify preemptive action.4 9
Intelligence is one of the most important aspects of counterterror-
ism. 50 Some would argue intelligence is the most critical issue.5 1 Without
it, operational counterterrorism would be reacting blindly. Intelligence
information provides justification for state self-defense.5 2 Intelligence tells
decisionmakers that a risk of attack exists and who is planning the attack,
and it facilitates appropriate self-defense measures. 53 It is, however, imper-
fect, subject to interpretation, and full of uncertainties, misinformation,
and disinformation. 54 Therefore, intelligence is far from empirical. Never-
theless, intelligence is the essential basis for effective operational
counterterrorism. 55
Intelligence has been defined as the collection and analysis of informa-
tion relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy
designed to further its national security interests and respond to threats
from actual or potential adversaries. 56 Critical to fully understanding this
definition is how actors translate intelligence information into operational
measures. Without knowing who the terrorist is, governments cannot
know where he is. Without knowing where he is, governments cannot pre-
vent attacks. Without intelligence information, governments are unable to
45. Wayne McCormack, Patriot, Privacy, and Politics, Hous. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2004, at
24, 30 (quoting former Attorney General John Ashcroft as saying that "[t]here is always
the prospect of violence around any corner").
46. Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 16, at 539, 541 (discussing international sup-
port for this statement from countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom).
47. Glennon, supra note 16, at 27.
48. Targeted Killing, supra note 5, at 325.
49. See Marks, supra note 16, at 83-84.
50. Unholy Trinity, supra note 15, at 428.
51. For additional information, see Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community
Reorganization: Declining the Invitation to Struggle, 101 YALE LJ. 867 (1992); Simon
Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law,
27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071 (2006); Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Demo-
cratic States and Terrorist Organizations: Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389 (2003)
[hereinafter Laws of War]; Lee H. Hamilton, Lecture, Fighting Terrorism, 12 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2005); Grant T. Harris, Note, The CIA Mandate and the War on
Terror, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 529 (2005); Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1655 (2006).
52. See Unholy Trinity, supra note 15, at 428.
53. See id. at 428-29; see also Schmitt, supra note 15, at 756.
54. Unholy Trinity, supra note 15, at 446 (defining disinformation as consciously
telling an interrogator what the interrogated person think the interrogator wants to hear,
and misinformation as unconsciously doing so).
55. Id. at 428.
56. ABRAM N. SHULSKY & GARY J. SCHMirr, SILENT WARFARE: UNDERSTANDING THE
WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE 2 (3d ed. 2002); see also W. Raymond Wannall, The FBI's
Domestic Intelligence Operations: Domestic Security in Limbo, 4 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 443, 446 (1991).
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"connect the dots" in the best case; and in the worst case, governments are
unable to even identify the "dots."
Intelligence gathering must be specifically tailored to the means by
which terrorists and their supporters communicate. Intelligence gathering
primarily comes from three sources: (1) human intelligence (HUMINT);
(2) signal intelligence (intercepted communications or SIGINT); and (3)
open sources (such as newspapers or the internet).5 7 Each mode of
obtaining information is critical to a nation's counterterrorism strategy. 58
Analyzing self-defense requires understanding the relationship
between intelligence gathering and the decision to act. In seeking to objec-
tify self-defense, it is important that the intelligence information justifying
state action be evaluated according to established criteria. To that end, the
following preliminary principle and strategic questions are relevant:
1) When does the actor possess information sufficient to justify tak-
ing action?
2) How is sufficient information defined?
3) What are the criteria for determining whether the intended victim
needs additional time or "another sign" prior to acting?
These questions are posed with the understanding that if the actor
waits too long, an otherwise preventable attack will occur.5 9 Use of intelli-
gence information requires decisionmakers to answer the following four
tactical or practical questions:
1) How reliable is the source?
2) Is the information corroborated?
3) How viable is the information?
4) How actionable is the information?
Lawful self-defense predicated on the limits of power requires developing a
model based on rationality. While intelligence gathering and analysis is
not an empirical science, maximum effort is required to minimize guess
work and best estimates; if commanders are to act on intelligence informa-
57. See THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., IMPROVING ARMY PLANNING FOR FUTURE MULTINA-
TIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS 324 (2001); see also Amos N. Guiora, Where Are Terrorists
to Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U.
L. REV. 805, 810 n.33 (2007) (discussing HUMINT and SIGINT as the two primary
intelligence gathering sources) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis].
58. See SZAYNA ET AL., supra note 57, at 324.
59. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (2007) ("Neverthe-
less, the events of the summer of 2006 suggest that there is at least a presumption in
favor of maximizing early intervention in terrorism cases."); David A. Westbrook, Law
Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299, 309 (2000) ("If security is now better procured than
defended, then early intervention will often be more effective and cheaper than late
intervention. Contemporary strategic thinking inclines to the adage 'a stitch in time
saves nine.' Diffuse threats to security should be addressed before they have time to gain
focus and momentum. The task for contemporary strategic thinking is therefore the
avoidance, rather than the development, of the logic of war."). See generally Clive
Walker, Constitutional Governance and Special Powers Against Terrorism: Lessons Learned
from the United Kingdom's Prevention of Terrorism Acts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1997); Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitution-
alism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (2007).
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tion, the information must be subject to strict scrutiny. 60
Unlike evidence the prosecutor submits in court that is subject to the
defendant's right to confront his or her accuser, 6 1 intelligence information
is gathered and analyzed only by the decisionmaker. In the current model,
the commander or decisionmaker assumes the role of judge or jury62 in
determining whether the information is actionable. The proposed model-
critical to a re-articulation of self-defense-suggests expanding the FISA
Court's purview to include reviewing intelligence information relevant to
operational counterterrorism. However, a recommended standard for ana-
lyzing the reliability and sufficiency of the information is dependent on the
adoption of a modified version of the right to confront.
Such a test seemingly limits the nation-state's right to self-defense.
Perhaps one could perceive it as at odds with the proposition this article
advocates. In essence, however, this article suggests a balancing test. Bal-
ancing would enable the nation-state to act earlier than currently allowed,
but only after subjecting the intelligence information to strict scrutiny by a
court.63 The preemptive self-defense model proposed in this article grants
state actors greater latitude with respect to when to act. In the proposed
model, the information justifying state action would be subject to strict
scrutiny by an independent court. Unlike the criminal law paradigm
which is comprised of checks and balances, 6 4 operational counterterror-
ism predicated on intelligence information is not presently subject to insti-
tutionalized criteria or independent analysis. The proposed strict scrutiny
standard reflects a balanced approach regarding operational counterterror-
ism: act earlier but with greater certainty.
In 2006, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff articulated the relationship between intelligence and operational
decisions in the following manner:
60. For additional information, see, for example, Robert M. Chesney, Careful Think-
ing About Counterterrorism Policy, I J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 169 (2005); Christo-
pher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional Intelligence
Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721 (2007); Unholy Trinity, supra note 15; Ron Wyden, Law
and Policy Efforts to Balance Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 America, 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 331 (2006).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. The distinction depends on whether the trial is a bench or jury trial.
63. Perhaps the most egregious example of not submitting intelligence information
(not to mention the politicization of the information) is President Bush's decision to
invade Iraq because of CIA reports regarding the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion (WMD) in Iraq or a purported link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11. See gener-
ally BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004). Rather than submitting the information to
a review similar to the proposed strict scrutiny, the Administration acted based on the
"slam dunk" assurance by then CIA Director George Tenet regarding the WMD and Vice-
President Cheney's assertion regarding the link. See id. at 25, 195-201. Both of these
assurances have been subsequently proven to be incorrect. See generally RICHARD A.
CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR (2004); GREGORY
HOOKER, SHAPING THE PLAN FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLI-
GENCE ASSESSMENTS (rev. ed. 2005); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR (2002).
64. The prosecutor's actions and motives are checked by the trial court, the jury,
defense counsel, and an available appeals process. See Michael M. O'Hear, What's Good
About Trials?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 209, 217 (2007).
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We don't wait until someone has lit he fuse to step in and prevent some-
thing from happening. That would be playing games with people's lives....
[W]e always intervene at the earliest possible opportunity, just as we've done
in a series of operations we've undertaken over the last couple of
months .... Last year's attacks in London, 2004's attacks in Madrid and, of
course, the attacks in 2001, are all reminders of the fact that we cannot drop
our guard, but at the same time, people can rest assured that we move very
swiftly at the first sign of a plot and we do not wait until the last minute to
intervene.... We swoop in as early as possible because experience shows-
and I think London is a great example-that the distance between planning
and actually [sic] operational activity is a very short distance. And anybody
who thinks they have time to wait and see how things play out, I think is
really taking a foolish approach to the issue of security.6 5
A. Invasion of Privacy
Intelligence gathering inherently violates an individual's privacy.6 6
Articulating the limits of self-defense requires addressing the individual's
right to privacy. 67 Whether the individual is subjected to wiretapping, mail
or email interceptions, or any other form of intelligence gathering, the pro-
cess invariably involves an invasion of privacy. 68 In seeking to re-articulate
the limits of self-defense it is incumbent on policymakers to analyze the
limits of intelligence gathering.
The Bush Administration's warrantless wiretapping69 of both Ameri-
can and non-American citizens in an effort to gather intelligence informa-
tion represents an unbalanced approach. 70 It is equally unbalanced,
however, to argue that the nation-state may neither wiretap nor intercept.
Were that the case, operational self-defense would truly be "groping in the
65. Press Conference, Michael Chertoff, U.S. Sec'y of Homeland Security (July 7,
2006), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0607/O7/ywt.01.html.
66. Baldwin & Shaw, supra note 26, at 431.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & Edmund L. Andrews, House Approves Changes in Eaves-
dropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush
and His Senior Aides Press On in Legal Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2006, at A13; James Ponsoldt, Letter to the Editor, Bush's Reversal on Wiretapping,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A22; James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wire-
tapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al; see also Ayers, supra note 26, at 681-82. See
generally Baldwin & Shaw, supra note 26.
70. The Bush Administration argued that Article II of the U.S. Constitution should
be read to authorize this particular executive action and its secrecy, and painted the
program as absolutely necessary to national security. For articles supporting the Presi-
dent's argument see generally John C. Eastman, Listening to the Enemy: The President's
Power to Conduct Surveillance of Enemy Communications During Time of War, 13 ILSAJ.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 49 (2006); John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Consti-
tution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 565 (2007). Critics of the wiretapping program pointed to
existing mechanisms to maintain secrecy and deemed warrantless wiretapping as not
only a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but also as a dangerous maneuver to miscon-
strue the balance between organs of the government. See the following articles support-
ing this view: Bob Barr, Post-9/11 Electronic Surveillance Severely Undermining Freedom,
41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1383 (2007); David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Secur-
ity Agency's Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355 (2006); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Our Ignorance About Intelligence, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233 (2006).
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dark," if not impossible. Accordingly, the challenge is to define the limits
of self-defense that enable sufficient intelligence gathering and ensure that
preemptive self-defense is operationally viable.
Criminal law has a long history trying to maintain the delicate balance
between preventing criminal action and maintaining privacy interests of
individuals. 7 1 The excerpt below from Katz v. United States7 2 demon-
strates the Supreme Court's analysis of the issues surrounding privacy pro-
tection, the individual, and the manner in which the government obtains
information in a criminal context.73
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of
the booth can have no constitutional significance.
The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure
conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that
regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in an entirely
defensible manner: They did not begin their electronic surveillance until
investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong
probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling
information to persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover,
the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific
purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic
communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods
during which he used the telephone booth, and they took great care to over-
hear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear
that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically
informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the
precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized,
with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the
Government asserts in fact took place. ...
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "not-
withstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause," for the Consti-
tution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police ...." "Over and
again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amend-
ment requires adherence to judicial processes," and that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
71. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1968), for a discussion of criminal law's
underlying mission in balancing governmental interests, such as crime prevention and
detection, and individual interests, such as those involving privacy.
72. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. See generally id.
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... The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it
urges the creation of a new exception to cover this case. It argues that sur-
veillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual require-
ment of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable
cause. We cannot agree....
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
7 4
Katz sought to minimize government invasion of privacy with respect
to wiretaps. 75 It is relevant to the self-defense paradigm because it helps to
articulate what measures the government can take-and when-to protect
itself.
B. Limits of Intelligence-Limits of Power
Intelligence failures and successes are important in understanding the
limits of self-defense. On the one hand, limiting how the nation-state col-
lects intelligence directly impacts how the nation-state engages in self-
defense. 76 On the other hand, the nation-state cannot protect itself "by all
means necessary." 77 As the 9/11 Commission made clear, however, just
because one has received intelligence does not guarantee that the intelli-
gence will be used effectively. 78 The flip side of gathering intelligence is
analyzing the information received. 7 9 Without analysis, the information
will be merely information without context or significance. In the self-
defense paradigm, accurately and correctly analyzing intelligence is criti-
cal.80 After all, operational decisions are based on the most effective utili-
zation of that information.
Before making operational decisions based on gathered intelligence,
the nation-state must analyze it. The nation-state must determine who the
source is, whether the source is reliable, and whether outside factors are at
play. 81 If the nation-state acts on the received information without satis-
74. Id. at 353-55, 357-59.
75. Id. at 359.
76. For further discussion regarding the limits on collecting intelligence, see, for
example, Andrew Adler, Note, The Notice Problem, Unlawful Electronic Surveillance, and
Civil Liability Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393
(2007) (discussing the potential for civil remedies for violations of FISA); Ford, supra
note 60 (discussing Congress's role in the conduct of intelligence operations); Nathan
Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REv. 811 (2 00 7 )
(explaining the shortcomings of the existing secrecy regime).
77. Kyle K. Bradley, Note, A Mending Wall: A Critical Look at the International Court
of Justice's Analysis in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 419, 445
(2005).
78. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 254 (2004), available at http://www.9-licommission.gov.
79. Id.
80. David Kaye, Adjudicating Self-Defense: Discretion, Perception, and the Resort to
Force in International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 134, 167 (2005).
81. Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choos-
ing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNuMBRA 356, 361 (2008)
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factorily answering all three of these questions, the result may be unfortu-
nately irreversible.8 2 The potential fallout from inaccurate intelligence is
too significant not to subject it to additional review. Accordingly, in addi-
tion to review by the executive branch, intelligence information must be
subject to strict scrutiny from a separate branch of government-namely
the FISA Court. 83 From a substantive perspective, strict scrutiny requires
the executive to convince the FISA Court that the available intelligence
addresses the issues of source reliability and credibility.8 4
For preemptive self-defense to be lawful, the intelligence must meet a
strict-scrutiny standard. The Court in Katz limited government's intrusion
into privacy.8 5 In the same way, the proposed strict-scrutiny test would
limit the executive branch, not from the perspective of how the intelligence
is gathered, but rather how it is used in operational counterterrorism. 8 6 To
what degree the standard should be quantified is beyond the purview of
this article; there is a need to develop a model for the quantification of
reliability of intelligence information. What is critical, however, is that it
must pass judicial muster akin to admissibility in the criminal law
paradigm.8 7
II. Self-Defense and the Wild West
What is the connection between the Wild West and the aftermath of
9/11? The Wild West conjures up multiple images: the gun-slinging sher-
iff, the cowboy in the saloon, the frontier settlers chasing Native Americans
off Native land. The images of Wyatt Earp88 and Billy the Kid 8 9 are promi-
nent points of reference when discussing the Wild West.90 Furthermore,
the term "Wild West" is commonly used to express a paradigm of lawless-
ness or, at the very least, of a situation where one man-the sheriff-was to
(explaining that intelligence information must be shown to be "valid, viable, relevant,
and corroborated") [hereinafter Choosing a Forum].
82. Id.
83. See Comparative Analysis, supra note 57, at 835.
84. Id. at 834-35.
85. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-58 (1967).
86. Choosing a Forum, supra note 81, at 361.
87. See id.
88. Wyatt Earp (1848-1929) was an American farmer, teamster, officer of the law,
gambler, saloon-keeper, and miner best known for his participation in the Gunfight at
the O.K. Corral. See Jeff Meyer, A Tree of the Wild, Wild West, AM. FORESTS, Summer
2002, at 47, 47. Earp resided in the American West and established himself as a
lawman unafraid to use force to keep the peace. Id.
89. Billy the Kid (1859-1881), also known as Henry McCarty and William H. Bon-
ney, was a noted gunfighter and outlaw, known for his involvement in the Lincoln
County War and for escaping jail sentences several times throughout his life. See
Thomas Korosec, Trail of a Desperado: Is the Real Billy the Kid Buried in Central Texas?,
Hous. CHRON., May 10, 2007, at Al.
90. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Derelic-
tion of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv. 57, 96 (1995): see also Jason J. Ben,
America's Need to Explore Alternatives to Incarceration: Can America Purport to Be the
"Land of the Free" When It Currently is the World's Leading Incarcerator?, 30 S.U. L. REV.
349, 350-51 (2003).
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bring and preserve peace and tranquility to a particular community.9t
Any discussion regarding the Wild West invariably involves analyzing
the role of the local sheriff. Society has glorified the sheriff as the ultimate
manifestation of good-he protects the weak and helpless and drives out, if
not kills, those who would destroy society. He is perceived as the represen-
tative of the community, acting on its behalf without personal gain or bene-
fit. Presented here are two very different scenarios: the story of Wyatt Earp
and the Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, and the story of Sheriff Pat Garrett
and his quest for Billy the Kid.9 2 As seen in both stories, however, many
questions remain as to whether the glory was rightfully bestowed on both
Wyatt Earp and Pat Garrett. Who were these sheriffs protecting society
against? How did these sheriffs protect society? Defining the limits of, or
establishing criteria for, self-defense ultimately depends first on accurately
identifying the enemy. 93
A. Pat Garrett and the Death of Billy the Kid
Pat Garrett's alleged killing of Billy the Kid raises the question of pre-
emptive self-defense. Although Billy the Kid was known as a notorious out-
law,9 4 several pertinent questions surround his death. According to
Garrett's own account, after Billy escaped from jail, Garrett got wind of
where Billy was hiding in Fort Sumner; Garrett then entered the house and
sat on a bed. 95 Billy entered the room where Garrett was sitting and Billy
shouted "quien es?" (who is it). 96 Garrett saw that Billy had a "revolver in
his right hand and a butcher knife in his left. [Billy] came directly towards
me."
97
Others, however, question whether or not Garrett told the correct ver-
sion of the story:
91. See Laura E. G6mez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the
American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1129,
1130 (2000); see also Jeffreyj. Look, Law and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 24
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 817, 817 (2002) ("However, like Wyatt Earp and his broth-
ers riding into town to bring order to chaos, Congress and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) stepped in to give intellectual property owners
additional weapons to control infringers ....").
92. Pat Garrett (1850-1908) was a noted sheriff of the American West who was
responsible for bringing famed outlaw Billy the Kid to justice and then killing Kid after
his final escape from jail. O'CONNOR, supra note 34, at 86-87, 133-34.
93. Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objection to the International
Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 344
n.19 (1999) (quoting EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE NUREMBERG-FALLACY: WARS AND WAR
CRIMES SINCE WORLD WAR 11 16 (1973) (stating "the need to identify the enemy as the
aggressor is not new")).
94. See Frederick S. Calhoun, Westering and the Law, 1 Wyo. L. REV. 603, 608
(2001); Robert L. Glicksman, Lecture, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 647, 662 (1997); Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime,
36 B.C. L. REV. 953, 999 n.173 (1995).
95. PAT F. GARRETT, THE AUTHENTIC LIFE OF BILLY, THE KID 174 (Univ. of Okla. Press
2000) (1882).
96. Id. at 175.
97. Id.
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Was Pat Garrett justified in killing the Kid in the parlor ... without having
given him even the slightest chance to know that his life was in jeopardy?
Did the Kid, at the time he was killed, have a butcher knife in his hand, and
was he on his way to the kitchen to slice off a chunk of meat from the hind-
quarter of beef, because he was hungry . . . ?98
This event is of seminal importance in the self-defense debate.
Although the Kid's outlaw status was widely recognized and the threat he
posed to society was indisputable, it is not clear whether he presented a
threat at the time he was killed. One of the critical questions in the self-
defense debate is what threat does the perceived enemy present at a specific
moment in time.
The Billy the Kid incident raises an additional question-is a perceived
enemy a legitimate target at all times? That is, should the preemptive self-
defense doctrine enable the nation-state to kill a serious threat regardless
of whether the individual was engaged in harmful or threatening activity
when attacked?
Accounts regarding the death of Billy the Kid suggest a controversy
regarding whether Garrett acted based on intelligence information. The
true story of what happened on that night in Fort Sumner may never be
known. Garrett was never questioned about his actions, and the questions
remain. 99 Nation-states, however, do not have the luxury of Pat Garrett; a
nation-state is held accountable for its actions. Precisely because deci-
sionmakers bear substantive responsibility for their actions, by addressing
source reliability and credibility, the strict-scrutiny model protects nation-
states from relying on inaccurate intelligence information.
Billy the Kid's past was literally a matter of public record. However,
his future actions were unknown to Pat Garrett. There was no available
intelligence information justifying self-defense. Though it is clear that Gar-
rett initiated the event, his basis for doing so was predicated on past events
rather than future actions. If Garrett had possessed intelligence informa-
tion indicating that Billy had plans to commit future crimes, then arguably
self-defense (in protecting the community) could be claimed. By analogy,
the Billy the Kid paradigm represents how not to practice active self-
defense. It is at the far end of a spectrum regarding action based on past
acts devoid of intelligence information regarding future acts.
B. Wyatt Earp and the Gunfight at the O.K. Corral
While Garrett's killing of Billy the Kid is controversial precisely
because of the uncertainty over whether Billy held a gun in his hand, Wyatt
Earp's "showdown" at the O.K. Corral presents an alternative paradigm
regarding self-defense. Wyatt Earp migrated to Tombstone in 1879 to help
his brother Virgil, the deputy U.S. Marshal.' 00 After a year of incidents
between the Earp brothers and the Clantons and the McLaurys (lawless
98. RAMON F. ADAM,, A FITTING DEATH FOR B1 LY THE KID 19 (1960).
99. See id.
100. See Henry S. Cohn, Murder in Tombstone: The Forgotten Trial of Wyatt Earp, FED.
LAW., Apr. 2005, at 60, 60.
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Cowboy families), a shoot-out took place on October 26, 1881, at the O.K.
Corral.101
Just before the bullets started flying, Virgil had been told that Ike Clanton
had taken to the streets and was threatening to kill the Earps. Virgil, Wyatt,
a third brother, Morgan, and Wyatt's unsavory friend, Doc Holliday, set off
to find Ike. Sheriff Behan met them along the road and tried to stop them,
saying that he would handle the situation and disarm Ike and anyone with
him. Virgil ignored Behan and approached the corral, where he found Ike
and Billy Clanton as well as Tom and Frank McLaury. Did Virgil ask his
opponents to disarm? Did the Cowboys reply by opening fire? We have no
clear answers to these questions. All we know is that the Earps and Holliday
began to fire their guns. After "thirty shots in thirty seconds," Virgil and
Morgan were badly wounded, and Billy Clanton and Tom and Frank
McLaury were dead. Wyatt Earp, Doc Holliday, and Ike Clanton were not
injured, Clanton having run out of the corral during the fight.102
After initially learning that Ike had taken to the streets, Wyatt Earp
went searching for the people posing the perceived threat, the Clantons. 10 3
Did Wyatt act on an imminent threat? Should Wyatt have waited until Ike
Clayton attempted to kill him, or was it justifiable for Wyatt to go looking
for Ike? Were Wyatt's actions reasonable? Did he act upon reasonable
intelligence?
Wyatt Earp acted on what he had been "told." While history is unclear
as to the source's identity (and therefore its reliability and viability) Earp's
actions are distinguishable from Pat Garrett's. While undoubtedly both
Garrett and Earp initiated their respective encounters, Earp responded to a
warning he had received through his brother. 10 4 Accordingly, the actions
of the Earp brothers were anticipatory in nature.
By analogy, Earp's actions would satisfy a strict-scrutiny test-he had
a clearly identifiable enemy, a valid threat, and early warning. Sherriff
Behan met the Earps on the road and told them that he would take care of
the situation. 10 5 Yet, the Earps ignored him and acted anyway, 10 6 even
though they were not required to act. However, in the context of repeated
incidents between the involved parties, the Earp brothers' actions-though
preventable-are justifiable. Because of the concrete warning Virgil
received, self-defense is a particularly valid argument-unlike in Garrett's
101. Id.
102. Id. at 60-61.
Virgil Earp represented the federal jurisdiction in Tombstone, but the territorial
government had appointed Johnny Behan sheriff of the county. Behan was an
adept politician, a Democrat who had won appointment from Arizona's provi-
sional governor, John C. Fremont. In 1856, Fremont, an explorer and popular
hero, had been the first Republican candidate for president. Behan took a less
confrontational attitude than the Earps took toward the Cowboys, and the sher-
iff apparently ignored some of the cattle rustlers' illegal activities.
Id. at 60.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 60-61.
106. Id.
Vol. 41
2008 Self-Defense- From the Wild West to 9/11
situation. It is important to note at this juncture the qualification that
although it is justifiable for Earp-or the executive-to act under these cir-
cumstances, the question of whether the executive should act is not within
the purview of this proposed model.
III. U.S. Constitutional Law
U.S. constitutional law provides the foundation for an individual's
right to self-defense. 10 7 The strict-scrutiny standard this article proposes
addresses when the nation-state's right to self-defense should begin. The
analysis begins with relevant constitutional law principles because the
"when" is predicated on the right, and in particular, the right to bear arms.
Analyzing the intent of the Founding Fathers with respect to self-
defense is critical to a discussion regarding an individual's right to self-
defense and the limits of power. 10 8 The Founders' intent, after all, is the
basis for determining the constitutionality of the executive's actions. 10 9
The relevance to self-defense against a non-state actor is by analogy-if the
individual has the right to self-defense, then the nation-state has the right
to question when the individual may act, based on what intelligence, and
against whom.
Scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution articulates a funda-
mental right to self-defense. 1 0 In analyzing this right to self-defense from
a constitutional perspective, scholars have emphasized the Second Amend-
ment."' The right to bear arms is directly related to the individual's right
to engage in self-defense. 1 2 Although the Founding Fathers did not specif-
ically discuss self-defense, James Madison's advocacy of the right to bear
arms reflects the viewpoint that self-defense is a fundamental right.1 13 Jus-
tice Holmes' phrase "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the pres-
ence of an uplifted knife" also succinctly summarizes the essence of self-
defense.114
In analyzing the concept of a fundamental right, the strict-scrutiny test
requires articulating why and when the principle of self-defense may be
107. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
108. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 228-30 (1983).
109. See Richard A. Allen, What Arms? A Textualist's View of the Second Amendment, 18
GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 191, 196 (2008).
110. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 187; Michele L. Lombardo et al., Terrorism, Mate-
rial Support, the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect Legiti-
mate Asylum Seekers in a Post-9/1 1, Post-Patriot Act, Post-Real ID Act World, 4 REGENT J.
INT'L L. 237, 244 (2006); Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and
Defense of Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 415-18 (2007).
111. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 188-93; Volokh, supra note 110, at 418.
112. See Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 162 (2002);
Johnson, supra note 2, at 188-89.
113. See Kates, supra note 108, at 228-30 (noting that in The Federalist No. 46
Madison "assured his fellow countrymen that they need never fear their government
because of 'the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess"').
114. Johnson, supra note 2, at 205.
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made operational. Therefore, it is important to analyze from whom the
individual is protecting himself. 115 That is, why should a person have the
right to bear arms, and for what purpose? To that end, one method of
interpretative analysis is from the perspective of the Founding Fathers. 1 6
In engaging in that analysis it is necessary to explore in greater depth
the significance of the Second Amendment. The fundamental right of self-
defense is encapsulated in the Framers' expression of the right to bear
arms. 1 1 7 After all, why was the word "bear" used? If a person bears arms
to commit a crime, then the Executive branch (law enforcement) will arrest
that person according to laws the that legislature has enacted, and the judi-
ciary will determine guilt and punish if necessary. If, however, the person
asserts a defense of self, family, or property that requires bearing arms,
then the Second Amendment guarantees his right.' 18
Recently, in District of Columbia v. Heller,119 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Second Amendment confers a fundamental, individual right to
possess a firearm for traditional use such as for private self-defense in the
home.120 This landmark decision was the first concrete statement from
the Supreme Court as to the application of the Second Amendment to indi-
viduals. Before Heller, in United States v. Gomez 12 1 and United States v.
Panter,12 2 two U.S. Courts of Appeal upheld that fundamental right. In
Gomez, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's possession of a firearm
was justified because he was under a threat of death after he was named as
a government informant in a drug conspiracy. 123 Similarly, in Panter, the
defendant argued that he possessed a firearm only momentarily for self-
defense after being attacked by a convicted murder. 124 The Fifth Circuit
agreed and found that his possession was justified. 12 5 While constitu-
tional law provides an individual with the right to self-defense, criminal
law governs when and how an individual may exercise that right.
IV. U.S. Criminal Law
The criminal law paradigm is inherent to any discussion regarding
self-defense. When may an individual act to protect him or herself?. When
may an individual act to repel the threat of deadly force? These questions
115. See Kates, supra note 108, at 217 n.53 (stating that the right to bear arms had
three purposes: defending and securing food for one's family, granting arms to the mili-
tia, and law enforcement).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 229-30.
118. See generally Frank Espohl, The Right to Carry Concealed Weapons for Self-
Defense, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151 (1997) (discussing the right to carry a concealed weapon
for protection, stemming from the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
119. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
120. See id. at 2821-22.
121. 81 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996).
122. 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982).
123. Gomez, 81 F.3d at 846.
124. Panter, 688 F.2d at 270.
125. Id. at 272.
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are relevant by analogy to international law with respect to the relationship
between state and non-state actors.
A. Definition
In defining justifiable self-defense, common law and the Model Penal
Code differ regarding when deadly force may be used. At common law, a
person is justified in using deadly force against another if he reasonably
believes that the force is necessary to repel the imminent use of unlawful
deadly force by another sufficient to cause bodily injury. 12 6 The Model
Penal Code states that "the use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless
the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled
by force or threat."'127
Although the common law requires an imminent threat, 128 the Model
Penal Code does not have an imminence requirement. 12 9 The Model Penal
Code also places no time constraint on when the actor may act for protec-
tion, only that the act be necessary. 130 While the common law adopts an
objective test requiring that the actor have a reasonable belief that force is
necessary, 13 1 the Model Penal Code requires proof that the actor only sub-
jectively believe force is necessary. 132
Imminence and reasonableness are particularly relevant to the limits
of self-defense between both state and non-state actors, and more broadly
to international law.' 33 When may a nation-state act? Must they react to
an immediate threat of harm, or must the force only be necessary to protect
them from harm at some point in the future? Based on what level of threat
may a nation-state act? How much intelligence and what kind of intelli-
gence must a nation-state have in order to act? Must the threat be objec-
126. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Richard
A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 371, 378-79 (1993).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE §3.04(2)(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
128. Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1230.
129. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b).
130. Id.
131. Peterson, 483 F.2d at 1230.
132. See Marco F. Bendinelli & James T. Edsall, Defense of Others: Origins, Require-
ments, Limitations and Ramifications, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 153, 188 (1995) (stating that
the Model Penal Code promulgates a "largely subjective test of what the actor believes").
133. See generally Nabati, supra note 10 (discussing how, just as in criminal law, inter-
national law could introduce a "reasonable nation standard"); Mark L. Rockefeller, The
"Imminent Threat" Requirement for the Use of Preemptive Military Force: Is It Time for a
Non-Temporal Standard?, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 131 (2004) (discussing replacing
"imminence" with "necessity" on the national defense level); Michael Skopets, Com-
ment, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-Defense in
International Law, 55 Am. U. L. REV. 753 (2006) (discussing the parallels between pre-
emptive strikes in international law and battered women who attack abusers); John Yoo,
Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 777 (2004) ("Self-defense in international law is
conceptualized . . . in terms of imminence, necessity, and proportionality. The analogy
between self-defense in criminal and international law has taken such hold that domes-
tic criminal law scholars sometimes illustrate the doctrine with examples from interna-
tional law.").
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tively reasonable based on a set of criteria, or may the nation-state act on
its own subjective belief of a threat?
B. Imminence
Scholars suggest that the central debate surrounding self-defense in
criminal law is whether legitimate, justifiable self-defense standards should
require an element of imminence. 13 4 That is, can individuals act only in
response to an imminent threat? Much of the debate focuses on Battered
Woman Syndrome (BWS). 135 In particular, the question is whether the
imminence requirement should be waived for battered women claiming
self-defense when they use deadly force against their batterers.13 6
BWS is best illustrated in the case of State v. Norman.13 7 John Nor-
man put his wife Judy through constant abuse-he beat her, broke glasses
on her, extinguished his cigarettes on her, forced her to prostitute herself,
called her a dog, made her eat dog food and sleep on the floor, and
threatened to kill her.138 Judy Norman endured this abuse for over 20
years, eventually shooting her husband in the back of the head while he
was sleeping. 13 9 Although she argued self-defense, the jurisdiction where
Mrs. Norman was prosecuted required that the threat be imminent to jus-
tify use of deadly force. 140 Because Mr. Norman did not present a threat at
the moment he was shot (because he was asleep), Mrs. Norman could not
claim self-defense and was convicted of manslaughter. 14 1
In response, several scholars argued that self-defense should not
include an imminence requirement. 142 Rather, according to this theory,
134. See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 285 n.304 (2002); George P.
Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PIrT. L. REV. 553,
567-68 (1996); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235,
1235-37 (2001); Rosen, supra note 126, at 379-81.
135. Lenore Walker is widely credited with coining the term "battered woman syn-
drome," which Walker alleges to be common characteristics shared by survivors of
domestic violence. See Burke, supra note 134, at 220-21.
136. See id. at 275-78 (answering in the affirmative); David L. Faigman & Amy J.
Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 67, 81
(1997); Fletcher, supra note 134, at 567-68; Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-
Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 11, 53-54 (1986).
137. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id. at 9-10.
140. Id. at 12 (citing State v. Gappins, 357 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1987)).
141. Id. at 9.
142. See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine
of Self-Defense to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM.J. CrIM. L. 169, 185 (1991) ("The
traditional self-defense rules need to be expanded to meet the reality of today's society.").
Others, however, argue that the definition of self-defense should not change-that BWS
does not necessitate an elimination of the imminence requirement. See, e.g., Holly
Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense; Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379-82 (1991). Maguigan argues that eliminating the
imminence standard would not be the most effective way of bringing about reform for
battered women because in most jurisdictions, the existing laws, evidentiary rules, pro-
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self-defense requirements can be satisfied if the use of force was necessary
in the face of a threat.143 This proposed standard is similar to the
approach of the Model Penal Code. 144
C. Reasonableness
The other relevant issue is whether justifiable self-defense requires an
objective, reasonable belief or just a subjective belief that force was neces-
sary.145 The objective standard inquires "whether a reasonable person in
[the] defendant's circumstances would have perceived self-defense as nec-
essary." 146 Conversely, according to the subjective standard, "all that is
relevant to the actor's guilt is that he did honestly believe it necessary to
use force in his own defense."' 4 7
Reasonableness is most effectively discussed by analyzing People v.
Goetz. 148 Bernard Goetz sat on a subway car occupied by four youths,
none of whom displayed a weapon. 14 9 One or two of the youths went up to
Mr. Goetz and said "give me five dollars.' 150 In response, Goetz pulled out
a handgun and shot all four youths in succession. 15 1 Was it self-defense?
Goetz was indicted but moved for dismissal arguing that the prosecutor
gave the incorrect standard for self-defense to the grand jury.' 5 2 Goetz
argued that the prosecutor should have instructed the jury on a subjective
standard. 15 3 The appellate court held that the prosecutor did not err in
applying an objective standard of reasonableness, which asks what a rea-
sonable person in Goetz's situation would have done. 154
Goetz illustrates the complex issues surrounding reasonableness.
Should Goetz have been judged on whether a reasonable person would have
believed that self-defense was necessary against the four unarmed youths?
Or, should the court have judged him on his personal belief that self-
defense was necessary against the four unarmed youths?
Some scholars argue that self-defense should be based on an objective,
reasonable person standard. 155 For example, Kevin Jon Heller argues that
cedural rules, and jury instructions are already defined in a way that allows for self-
defense claims of battered women. Id. at 458.
143. Rosen, supra note 126, at 380.
144. See supra Part IV.A.
145. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provo-
cation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (1998); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in
Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 192-93 (1998); Nourse, supra note 134, at 1235-40.
146. Heller, supra note 145, at 8 (internal quotation omitted).
147. Id. at 56 (internal quotation omitted).
148. 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986).
149. Id. at 100.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 107. The prosecutor gave the grand jury an objective standard of reasona-
bleness. Id.
153. Id. at 110-11.
154. Id. at 116-17.
155. See Lee, supra note 145, at 193.
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an objective standard is necessary to "ensure that... there is no fluctuat-
ing standard of self-control against which accused are measured. The gov-
erning principles are those of equality and individual responsibility, so
that all persons are held to the same standard, notwithstanding their dis-
tinctive personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the stan-
dard."156 Heller thus argues for a standard that accounts for individual
differences and articulates criteria by which the rule of law can govern. 15 7
Despite this rationale, the Model Penal Code and some states still utilize
the subjective standard and require only that the individual believe that
force is necessary. 15 8
The issues relevant to self-defense in criminal law-imminence and
reasonableness-are the subject of disagreement amongst scholars and
practitioners. Scholars question whether imminence should be a require-
ment or whether an individual need only believe that action is necessary for
purposes of self-defense.' 5 9 Other scholars advocate requiring an objective
standard, which asks whether a reasonable person in the actor's situation
would believe that force was necessary. 16 °
Although U.S. constitutional law grants an individual the right to self-
defense 16 ' and criminal law governs when an individual may exercise that
right, 162 the themes and questions may translate by analogy to the rights of
nation-states. Do nation-states have a fundamental right to self-defense? If
so, when can nation-states act? Must they act only in response to immi-
nent harm, or can they act when it is necessary to protect against future
harm? International law seeks to answer these questions.
V. International Law and Self-Defense
International law provides nation-states with the right to self-
defense. 16 3 How international law seeks to define and limit this right to
self-defense has been analyzed at length. 164 This article will neither revisit
prior discussions nor emphasize the ambiguity of the debate. Rather, in
seeking to articulate new standards, reflective of contemporary conflict,
this article seeks to build on what scholars have already suggested. The
156. Heller, supra note 145, at 8 (internal quotation omitted).
157. See id.; see also Lee, supra note 145, at 193.
158. MODEL PENAL CODE §3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 2007); see, e.g., Erica
Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evi-
dence, 47 Loy. L. REv. 81, 106 n.115 (2001) (discussing Model Penal Code's subjective
standard); Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 132, at 187-89 (discussing the subjective
standard of various state courts).
159. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
161. See discussion supra Part III.
162. See discussion supra Part IV.
163. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence [sic] .... ").
164. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A
Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); James A. Green, Docking the Caroline:
Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International
Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDozo J. INT'L & COMp. L. 429 (2006).
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limitation of what has been previously offered, however, is that it is rele-
vant to yesterday's paradigm, rather than today's-much less
tomorrow's. 165 The discussion below emphasizes the need to re-articulate
how international law defines self-defense. It does not argue the irrele-
vance of the UN Charter, 166 but rather proposes the articulation and
implementation of new standards reflecting a new reality. Before address-
ing customary international law, international conventions, and treaties, it
is critical to set the stage with respect to what the author refers to as "the
new threat." Although innumerable threats to the nation-state exist,16 7 this
article will focus on terrorist bombings.
Thomas Ricks argues that terrorist bombings are the greatest danger
facing American forces in Iraq. 16 8 The daily toll of insurgent bombings
against innocent Iraqi civilians 169 makes clear the damage caused to life
and property alike. The planned bombings in Trafalgar Square 170 and
Glasgow 17 1 indicate all too clearly the potential danger of terrorist bomb-
165. But see articles focusing on self-defense to fight terrorism, Jack M. Beard,
America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (2002); Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attack-
ing the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus
the State's Duty to Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 195 (2001); Joshua E.
Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating Terrorism: A Magi-
not Line for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense &
Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87 (2004); Shah, supra note 7.
166. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of
Military Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89 (2003); Thomas M. Frank, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or:
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970);
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (2002).
167. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533 (2002); Mark P. Popiel, Redrafting the Right
of Self-Defense in Response to International Terrorism, 6 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 5 (2003); Nor-
man G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An
Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331
(2003); Daphne Richemond, Transnational Terrorist Organizations and the Use of Force,
56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1001 (2007); Kimberly N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Propor-
tionality, and the Right of Self-Defense Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56 INTr'L & COMP.
L.Q. 141 (2007).
168. THOMAS E. RiCKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 218-19
(2006).
169. As of October 4, 2007, over 4454 civilians in Iraq died because of ground-based
bombing attacks. See Iraq Body Count, Large Bombings Claim Ever More Lives, Oct. 4,
2007, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/biggest-bombs/.
170. On June 29, 2007, two cars were found near Trafalgar Square loaded with nails
packed around canisters of propane and gasoline, set to detonate and potentially kill
hundreds in the theater and nightclub district. See Paisley Dodds, London Police Foil
Major Terror Plot, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/29/AR2007062900584_pf.html. This plot was
uncovered two days after Gordon Brown, the new prime minister, had taken office. See
id.
171. OnJune 29, 2007, thirty-six hours after the attempted London car bombings, the
suspected terrorists traveled to Glasgow where they attempted a failed car bombing at
Glasgow Airport. Id.; see also Airport Incident 'Was Terrorism,' BBC NEws, July 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/scotland/6257846.stm. Witnesses saw a car
drive through the doors of the main terminal building, then saw the driver and passen-
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ings. Moreover, the planned, but foiled, simultaneous attacks on commer-
cial airlines-whether departing from London 1 72 or the Philippines173 -all
highlight the enormous risk to society from terrorist bombings. While
other threats are no less significant-and perhaps some more dangerous-
terror bombings are the most concrete manifestation of contemporary
terrorism.
To explain the critical relationship between terrorist bombings and
self-defense, it is necessary to engage in a relatively lengthy discussion
regarding the former. Otherwise, the reader may perceive self-defense as
only an abstract concept. Therefore, the discussion below addresses self-
defense from a practical perspective-how society lawfully protects itself
from this threat.
Terror bombing is defined herein by the broadest possible parameters
to include the following: dirty bombs, suicide bombings, remote controlled
bombings (without terrorists exploding themselves, contrary to suicide
bombers), and nuclear weapons. Particular attention will be given to the
indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians accomplished by the bombing
methods mentioned above. Terror bombings, in the widest possible mean-
ing of the term, represent the greatest threat presently posed by terrorists.
Terror bombing is a concern precisely because of its indiscriminate nature,
increasingly widespread use, relative ease of production, and the difficulty
of perpetrator identification and prevention. Therefore, it is critical to
develop effective counterterrorism measures to combat this threat.
The threat of terror bombing differs from other forms of terrorist
attacks. To highlight this uniqueness, one may compare terror bombings
to airplane hijackings. First, airports already benefit from a security infra-
structure. 174 Although the efficacy of these systems is debatable, in theory,
airports could modify or intensify existing resources and procedures to
prevent attacks. 175 Second, in the airline industry, the intelligence com-
munity can use the records of flight plans to assesses and prioritize
gers jump out and attempt to detonate the vehicle. Airport Incident 'Was Terrorism,'
supra. The two incidents were found to be connected and were linked to a larger group
with plans for attack within the United States. John Steele, 45 Muslim Doctors Planned
US Terror Raids, TELEGRAPH, July 6, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml
?xml=/news/2007/07/05/nterror405.xml.
172. On August 10, 2006, the British police arrested twenty-one people in connection
with a terrorist plot to blow up an aircraft flying from the United Kingdom to the United
States. British Police: Plot to Blow up Aircraft Foiled, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2006, at
A14. The plot involved hiding liquid explosives in carry-on luggage, with at least six
flights targeted. Id.
173. On March 4, 2003, a bomb hidden in a backpack exploded at an airport termi-
nal in Davao, Mindanao in the Philippines killing twenty-one people. Uli Schmetzer,
Bomb Kills 21 at Philippine Airport: Iowa Missionary Among the Dead, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5,
2003, at 3.
174. See, e.g., Richard P. Campbell, America Acts: Swift Legislative Responses to the
September 11 Attacks, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 139, 144-45 (2002) (discussing security screen-
ing and airport access).
175. See id.
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risks. 17 6 There are a finite number of flights to an identifiable number of
potential cities (targets). Third, passengers knowingly accept the risk
when they choose to fly. Should passengers prefer, they could use another
form of transportation.
Terrorist bombings, however, are not as easily preventable. They do
not target one geographical area or industry. 17 7 Any building, bridge,
landmark, or gathering place is vulnerable to attack. Intelligence-gathering
capabilities to counter terrorist bombings is exponentially more difficult
than is responding to other terrorist tactics. 178 Not only is there no cur-
rent security system to protect all sites, it is impossible to create one. 1 79
Moreover, there are an unlimited number of potential targets and terrorist
actors. Thus, the intelligence assessment becomes much more difficult to
prioritize. 180
A. The Caroline Doctrine
In 1837, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated a definition
of self-defense that evolved into customary international law.18 1 Webster's
definition followed what has come to be known as the Caroline incident.
The Caroline was a U.S. steamboat that attempted to transport supplies to
Canadian insurgents. 18 2 A British force interrupted the Caroline's voyage,
shot at it, set it on fire, and let it wash over Niagara Falls. 183 Webster said
that Britain's act did not qualify as self-defense because self-defense is jus-
tified only if "[the] necessity of [that] self-defense [is] instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."'1 8 4
Therefore, the Caroline Doctrine limits the right of self-defense to situations
where "there is a real threat, the response is essential and proportional, and
all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted."'185 Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter narrowed the definition, 18 6 making self-defense
permissible only in the event of an armed attach.18 7
176. But see Michele S. Sheets, Comment, From ADIZ to SFRA: The FAA's Compliance
with Administrative Procedures to Codify Washington, D.C. Flight Restrictions, 71 J. AIR L.
& COM. 615, 647-48 (2006) (discussing exorbitant prices of filing flight plans).
177. See Amos N. Guiora, Terrorism Bombing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 3d ed.) (forthcoming 2008).
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Customary international law derives from "a general practice accepted as law."
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 156
U.N.T.S. 77.
182. See Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Devel-
opment of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493, 494-95 (1990).
183. See id. at 495.
184. Gross, supra note 165, at 211.
185. id.
186. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
187. Gross, supra note 165, at 211.
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B. UN Charter: Article 51
The UN Charter sought to articulate a world order devoid of military
conflict. 188 In an effort to avoid repeating the horrors of World War I the
UN Charter calls on nation-states to peacefully resolve their conflicts. The
purpose of the United Nations is to "save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war."'189 To satisfy this purpose, the Charter required that "[a]ll
Members ... settle their international disputes by peaceful means ... [and]
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'190
To that end, the UN Charter sought to limit when nation-states could
implement self-defense against other nation-states. Article 51 authorizes
self-defense only if an armed attack occurs:191
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. 19
2
The UN Charter narrows the Caroline Doctrine, which provided for
anticipatory self-defense if the threat to national security is reasonably
believed to be imminent.193 Article 51's concept of preemption has signifi-
cantly reduced the Caroline Doctrine in an international setting. The sig-
nificance of this narrowing cannot be underestimated: Article 51
transformed the Caroline Doctrine from a customary international law
principle enabling preemption to a treaty-based definition of self-defense
dependent upon the occurrence of an armed attack.
Although Article 51 clearly expresses the obligation of nation-states to
prevent war, Professor Jues Lobel has suggested the following:
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force except when
authorized by the Security Council or when undertaken by individual
nations in self-defense and in response to "an armed attack." Moreover, as a
188. See Karin G. Tackaberry, Time to Stand up and Be Counted: The Need for the
United Nations to Control International Terrorism, ARMY LAW, July 2007, at 1, 6; History
of the Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/ (last
visited Nov. 19, 2008); History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/un
history/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
189. U.N. Charter pmbl.
190. Id. art. 2, paras. 3-4.
191. See id. art. 51.
192. Id.
193. See Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September l1th: State
Responsibility, Self-Defense, and Other Responses, 11 CtARozo J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 37
(2003).
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general matter, the United Nations has sought to limit the Article 51 self-
defense exception to prevent its misuse. First, Article 51 permits only those
actions taken in self-defense; reprisals and retaliations are proscribed under
the U.N. Charter. In other words, a nation can respond to an ongoing
attack, including one waged by a terrorist organization, by using force.
However, that nation may not forcibly retaliate against another in response
to an unlawful act that the latter committed against the former in the past.
The reasoning behind this rule is simple: a nation subject to an ongoing
attack cannot be expected to wait for the international community's aid
before fighting back. Obviously, when a nation is under attack, immediate
action is necessary. On the other hand, a nation whose citizens are no
longer being attacked must seek U.N. intervention; to allow military repri-
sals would be to encourage the renewed use of force. This would result in a
spiraling escalation of violence. Thus, the U.S. government, most state
actors, the U.N. Security Council, and the International Court of justice have
officially taken the position that armed reprisals are outlawed. 19 4
The fundamental question facing decisionmakers in the context of
self-defense is when preemptive actions can be undertaken. 195 Preemptive
action must be predicated on intelligence information that meets the relia-
bility and corroboration standard this article seeks to forcefully advocate.
Furthermore, for preemptive action to be legitimate, it must be propor-
tional to the attack it is intended to prevent. 1 9 6 The threat must also be
concrete, not vague or based on loosely gathered intelligence that may be
more fantasy than fact. In determining proportionality, decisionmakers
must determine both the immediacy of the threat and its severity. 19 7
Customary international law permits a nation-state to respond to a
threat and infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of another nation when
four criteria are met: (1) the nation-state is acting in self-defense; (2) the
attack is substantial and military (i.e., not an isolated armed incident); (3)
the offending nation is complicit, unwilling, or unable to prevent further
attacks; and (4) the attack is widespread and imminent.198
Nation-states, to adequately defend themselves, must be able to fight
the terrorists before the terrorists attack. The nation-state must act
preemptively to either deter terrorists or, at the very least, prevent terror-
ism. The question that must be answered-both from a legal and policy
194. Jues Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan
and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 540 (1999) (citations omitted and emphasis
added).
195. See generally Chris Bordelon, The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self-
Defense under International Law, 9 CHAP. L. REv. 111 (2005); Reisman & Armstrong,
supra note 16.
196. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. 120061 lsrSC
53(4) § 60 (citing Targeted Killing, supra note 5).
197. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.CJ. 161, 167 (Nov. 6); Legality of Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.CJ. 226, 513-14 (July 8).
198. See generally Malvina Halberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response to the
Attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 11 CA DOZOJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 851,
852-55 (2004); Elizabeth A. Palmer, Democratic Intervention: U.S. Involvement in Small
Wars, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 313, 338 (2003). But see Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven,
Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 289
(2005) (suggesting a lowering of the "threshold on self-defense against private attacks").
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perspective-is what tools are necessary for the nation-state to combat ter-
rorist bombings? Active self-defense would appear to be the most effective
tool; that is, rather than wait for the actual armed attack to occur, 19 9 the
nation-state must be able to act anticipatorily 20 0 against the non-state
actor.
The development of a new body of international law providing legal
justification for such actions (active self-defense against a non-state actor)
must be consistent with existing principles and obligations of nation-
states: proportionality, military necessity, collateral damage, and exhaus-
tion or unavailability of peaceful alternatives. 20 1 The concepts of active
self-defense and the four customary international law principles previously
listed are not in conflict; rather, they are both critical to formulating an
international law response to modern warfare-which is clearly very differ-
ent war from traditional state against state conflict.
Examples of this modern warfare in which a nation-state attacks a
non-state actor by violating the host state, include Israel's attack against
Syria and the United States' attacks against Sudan. In response to a terror-
ist attack in Israel, the Israeli air force attacked terrorist bases in Syria.
20 2
Although Israel was widely criticized, 20 3 the Israeli Government explained
that the target was not Syria itself, but rather the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was
attacking terrorist bases located in Syria with no intent to violate Syrian
sovereignty. 20 4 Israel's argument appears disingenuous as the IAF breach
of Syrian airspace clearly violated Syrian sovereignty. 20 5 Israel's argument
is further weakened by events in 2007. In 2007, Israeli fighter planes
attacked a "nuclear target" in Syria. 20 6 However, this reported IAF attack
on a Syrian target(s) is substantially different from the previous raid: the
previous raid was on terrorist bases located in Syria whereas the most
recent attack (if media reports are accurate) was aimed at specific Syrian
199. Such as allowed by the U.N. Charter, art. 51.
200. Such as articulated by the Caroline case. See generally Gross, supra note 165.
201. See U.N. Charter art. 51; David P. Fidler, 'Non-Lethal' Weapons and International
Law: Three Perspectives on the Future, in THE FUTURE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOL-
OGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW 26, 28 (Nick Lewer ed., 2002).
202. Israel Strikes Base Inside Syria, CBS NEws, Oct. 5, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2003/10/05/world/main576590.shtml.
203. Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Strongly Deplores Israeli Air
Strike on Syrian Territory, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8918 (Oct. 5, 2003), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8918.doc.htm; Israeli Jets Attack Site Inside
Syria, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at Al.
204. Security Council Meets on Israeli Attack in Syria, CNN, Oct. 5, 2003, http://www.
cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/05/mideast/index.html.
205. See Sarah E. Smith, Comment, International Law: Blaming Big Brother: Holding
States Accountable for the Devastation of Terrorism, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 735, 774 n.329
(2003); Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old
Medicine for New Ills?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 415, 436 (2006); Mohamad Bazzi, Villagers:
Bombed Site Abandoned/Syrians Say Camp Attached by Israel Empty, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9,
2003, at A16; Ravi Nessman, Israeli and U.S. Officials Claim Camp in Syria was Active
Militants Said Base Empty Before Attack, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct, 11, 2003, at A9.
206. See Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, U.S. Confirms Israeli Strikes Hit Syrian Tar-
get Last Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at A12.
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targets.20 7
Similarly, the United States violated Sudanese and Afghan sovereignty
when the U.S. Air Force, in response to the 1998 embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania, attacked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. 20  The
United States fired seventy-nine tomahawk missiles at alleged Bin Laden
outposts in Sudan and Afghanistan, including a factory believed to produce
chemical weapons. 20 9 President Clinton relied on Article 51's self-defense
principle in justifying the act, 2 10 but added that the strikes "were a neces-
sary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist
attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities. '2 1 1 Although the attack may
be considered retaliatory rather than defensive in nature, the question of
anticipatory self-defense is still relevant to this attack.2 12 If, as had been
reported, the factory was indeed producing chemical weapons, then an
argument could be made that America, and America's allies would poten-
tially be in danger if the factory continued to operate. 2 13 Part VI shall dis-
cuss this attack further.
C. UN Security Council Resolutions Post-9/11
Following the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council passed two Reso-
lutions addressing appropriate responses to terrorism: UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1368214 and 1373.215 Relevant passages of these
resolutions appear below. UN Security Council Resolution 1368 states, in
relevant part,
The Security Council,
Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and secur-
ity caused by terrorist acts,
207. See id. Although details of the attack are largely unknown and a matter of specu-
lation, the justification for such a raid would in all likelihood be articulated as self-
defense based on the analysis of available intelligence information.
208. See James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to
Terrorist Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
209. Martinez, supra note 9, at 143.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Amy E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire- The First
Strike Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 117, 142-45 (2004) (discussing whether state-based action solely in response
to acts of terrorism is a violation of international law); Bennet, supra note 208, at Al.
213. See Bennet, supra note 208, at Al; David Johnston, February 7-13: No Chemical
Threat Found at Bombed Plant in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at A2; Steven Lee
Myers & Tim Weiner, After the Attack: The Chemicals; Possible Benign Use is Seen for
Chemical at Factory in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1998, at Al; James Risen & David
Johnston, Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1999, at A3.
214. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
215. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in
accordance with the Charter, ...
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpe-
trators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that
those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable;
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and
full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions
and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 (1999) of 19
October 1999;
5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terror-
ist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations
216
Additionally, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 states that
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368
(2001) of 12 September 2001, ...
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism,
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as rec-
ognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution
1368 (2001), ...
2. Decides also that all States shall: ...
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts,
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of infor-
mation; ...
3. Calls upon all States to: ...
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements
and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action
against perpetrators of such acts; .... 217
Scholars disagree over the effect of these resolutions on self-defense.
Some have suggested that the resolutions made a difference: (1) Both reso-
lutions reaffirmed the inherent right of "individual or collective self-
defense" as recognized by the UN Charter, under Article 51; (2) Resolution
1373 emphasized that any further acts would be considered threats to
peace and security; (3) Both "implicitly" recognized that the September 11
attacks constituted an attack on the United States, under Article 51; and
(4) According to 1373, members are "obligated to create the prescribed
legal framework in its national laws and institutions to combat terrorism,
and to co-operate fully with other states on a global scale in this effort...
thereby establishing an international legal framework to combat
216. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 214, pmbl., c1 3-5 (emphasis added).
217. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 216, pmbl., 99 2(b), 3(c) (emphasis added).
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Other scholars, however, argue that while the resolutions recognized
and reaffirmed the right of self-defense, they ultimately do not facilitate
nor articulate a broader reading of self-defense. 2 19 According to Professor
Greg Maggs, Resolution 1368 in particular
did not say what the right to self-defense entails. Most particularly, it did not
say that al-Qaeda had committed an "armed attack" for the purposes of Arti-
cle 5 and it did not say that the United States had a right to act in self-
defense in response to the attack by al-Qaeda. 220
Although existing international law grants nation-states a fundamen-
tal right to self-defense, the existing limitations-the Caroline Doctrine, UN
Charter Article 51, and Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373-do
not provide sufficiently clear guidance regarding when a nation-state may
act. More specifically, the existing law does not address when a nation-
state may take preemptive or anticipatory action against a non-state actor,
and thus does not provide an actionable guideline for modern-day armed
conflict.
VI. Strict-Scrutiny Standard
The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict-
scrutiny standard. The strict-scrutiny standard as proposed here would
enable nation-states to operationally engage a non-state actor at an earlier
time, predicated on intelligence information that would meet admissibility
standards akin to a court of law. To re-phrase, the strict-scrutiny test seeks
to strike a balance enabling the nation-state to act sooner than currently
"allowed," but subject to significant restrictions.
The ability to act sooner is limited, however, by the requirement that
the intelligence information relied on must be reliable, viable, valid, and
corroborated. The strict-scrutiny standard proposes that for nation-states
to act as early as possible to prevent a possible terrorist attack, the informa-
tion must meet admissibility standards similar to the rules of evidence.
The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.
The implementation of this review-considering no court of law will
in reality review the intelligence information that is the basis for the
attack-would have to occur in such a way that it has genuine teeth and is
218. See Curtis A. Ward, Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role
of the United Nations Security Council, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITy L. 289, 293-394 (2003)
(discussing the effects of UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373); see also Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 892 (2002) (empha-
sizing that the "operative part of the Resolution mandates economic sanctions to combat
terrorism" and that the "attacks were significant enough to trigger the right of self-
defense").
219. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001): What They Say and What They Do Not Say, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. (2001).
220. Gregory E. Maggs, The Campaign to Restrict the Right to Respond to Terrorist
Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and What the United States
Can Do About It, 4 REGENTJ. INT'L L. 149, 165-66 (2006).
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enforceable. If such an implementation did not occur, nothing would pre-
vent a nation-state from acting preemptively, whether or not available intel-
ligence met either the three-part test or the strict-scrutiny test this article
proposes. In essence, this proposal is predicated on the understanding
that while nation-states need to engage in operational counterterrorism,
mistakes regarding the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence
information can lead to tragic results. Adopting admissibility standards
akin to those utilized in criminal law would seek to minimize operational
error. That is this proposal's substantive thesis.
A. A Past Failure
Israel's retributive attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) after the 1972 Olympics offers an example of a preventable opera-
tional failure. This failure could have been prevented if the available intelli-
gence information had been subject to both the substantive and procedural
measures the strict-scrutiny proposal advocates. In the aftermath of the
1972 Olympic Games attack on Israeli athletes, 22 1 Prime Minister Golda
Meir ordered the Mossad 222 to kill the PLO members responsible for the
attack.2 23 Mossad agents killed a number of individuals known to have
participated in the attack.224 The operation was prematurely terminated,
however, after a Moroccan waiter-a victim of mistaken identity-was tragi-
cally killed in Lillehammer, Norway. 2 25 The relevance of this accidental
killing to the strict-scrutiny test is the following: if the nation-state adopts
an anticipatory self-defense policy, then the decision to "operationalize"2 2 6
depends on intelligence information.
The strict-scrutiny test seeks to achieve a critical balance between the
nation-state's need to protect itself (self-defense) and its requirement to
protect innocent individuals.2 27 The waiter was an innocent victim, killed
as a result of an operational error. However, as the nation-state was the
initiator, it had the primary responsibility to ensure minimum loss of inno-
cent life. 228 The principle of collateral damage, however, requires only
221. See Charles Bierbauer, Munich Remembered: 1972 Attack Led to Increased Secur-
ity, CNN, July 27, 1996, http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/27/munich.remembered/.
222. The Mossad is the Israeli foreign intelligence service responsible both for gather-
ing intelligence information and operational counterterrorism. See Bhoumik, supra note
13, at 325-26.
223. The operation "Wrath of God" targeted those responsible both for planning and
executing the attack. See generally SIMON REEVE, ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER: THE FULL STORY
OF THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS MASSACRE AND THE ISRAELI REVENGE OPERATION "WRATH OF
GOD" (2006).
224. Alan Abrahamson, Munich Terrorists Become Target of Israel's Wrath, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2002, at 4.
225. Id.
226. This is a term of art that I use to describe the decision to translate intelligence
information into operational reality.
227. Innocent individuals in counterterrorism fall into two categories: innocent vic-
tims of acts of terrorism and victims of collateral damage. See Igor Primoratz, State
Terrorism and Counterterrorism, in ETHICS OF TERRORISM & COUNTER-TERRORISM 69, 70
(Georg Meggle ed., 2005).
228. See Abrahamson, supra note 224.
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minimizing loss of innocent life.2 29 Does that mean that the mistaken kill-
ing of the waiter was acceptable within the boundaries of operational
counterterrorism?
B. The Need to Objectify Counterterrorism
One of the fundamental principles of counterterrorism and interna-
tional law is the lack of objectification. 23 0 To that end, one of the primary
goals of the strict-scrutiny test is to objectify operational counterterrorism.
Operational decisions are based on numerous considerations 2 3 1 made by
commanders and decisionmakers, based on subjectivity no less than objec-
tivity. Objectifying counterterrorism when acting in the name of self-
defense, then, suggests minimizing the subjective.
Imminence is, in many ways, the standard term of art when discussing
self-defense. 2 32 The typical operational dilemma that confronts com-
manders is "how imminent is imminent?" 23 3 By analogy to the school-yard
bully, is imminence when a fist is about to come in contact with the nose
or when the fist is elevated in the direction of the nose? Is it when the hand
is about to be closed into a fist? Perhaps when the nose has reasonable
suspicion to believe it is in danger?23 4 Alternatively, is it when the nose
229. "Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians and damage to civilian objects." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) art. 57(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
230. See NEIL J. SMELSER, THE FACES OF TERRORISM: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMEN-
SIONS 5 (2007).
231. These considerations include, but are not limited to: who is the intended target,
what are the alternatives (if any), what is the risk of collateral damage, and is the pro-
posed action proportional to the risk posed by the targeted individual? Edouard Kujaw-
ski & Gregory A. Miller, Quantitative Risk-Based Analysis for Military Counterterrorism
Systems, 10 Sys. ENGINEERING 273, 280 (2007).
232. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, "While Dangers Gather": The Bush Preemption Doc-
trine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 1, 2 (2005); Rosen, supra note 126, at 378-90; Skopets, supra note 133, at
775-77; Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HAv. L. REv. 1813, 1823-24 (2007); Shana Wallace, Com-
ment, Beyond Imminence; Evolving International Law and Battered Women's Rights to Self-
Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1760-62 (2004).
233. See James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45
NAVAL L. REv. 1, 45-55 (1998); Martinez, supra note 9, at 185-87; Mark S. Martins,
Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L.
REv. 1, 68-80 (1994); Nabati, supra note 10, at 797-99; Weiner, supra note 205, at
437-45.
234. See Canon Pence, Comment, Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi's Bid to Revise
Japan's Pacifist Constitution, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 335, 365 (2006) ("Japanese
forces are authorized to return fire when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for
use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves.., or those who are with them
.(internal quotation omitted)). But see Martinez, supra note 9, at 167 (arguing that
"State A must satisfy each of the elements ... on the basis of clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence, or clear, cogent and convincing evidence, and more than a reason-
able suspicion is required." (internal quotations omitted)).
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concludes there is probable cause?2 35
There are two distinct paradigms at work here: (1) when the nose sees
the fist and (2) when the nose believes it is conceivably in danger. The first
is physical and immediate-the fist is cocked; the question is how close it is
to the nose and what measures the nose can take to minimize the dan-
ger.23 6 The second is based on different factors and considerations: rather
than seeing the fist, the nose has gathered intelligence information that the
fist intends to strike23 7 -that is, the nose believes it is in danger from the
unseen fist.
To fully explain what unseen means, one must consider whether it
suggests the possibility of being blindsided or unseen to the extent that if
the hand is not closed there are indications that it will be closed. One must
consider other factors as well, such as whether there are time-sensitive or
event-dependent indications, or whether there is a prior history between
the fist and the nose that would affect the requisite decision making. To
continue the analogy, to understand the nose's actions, one must evaluate
the justification of action if the nose had not seen the clenched fist, but
others had taken it upon themselves to warn the nose that the fist was
clenched. If such an event occurred, one would have to consider whether
the purveyor of the warning is reliable or whether the information is viable
and can be corroborated. In the nose context, the classic paradigm sug-
gests that an internalized threat justifies physical action.2 38
The Wild West, as most commonly understood, was largely devoid of
restraints. 23 9 In applying the Wild West analogy, the Billy the Kid para-
digm represents how nation-states should not conduct operational
counterterrorism because the "new world order" post-9/11 requires enor-
mous thoughtfulness, sophistication, and creative strategic thinking. Mere
235. See Steven B. Roosa, Note, Rules of Engagement for Armed Standoffs and the Last
Full Measure of Devotion: Should Sedition Be a Factor in the Use of Deadly Force?, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 229, 231 (1996) (explaining that "in Tennessee v. Garner which outlines the
Fourth Amendment 'objective reasonableness' standard for justifying the use of deadly
force to apprehend a fleeing suspect[;] . . . for a law enforcement officer to be justified in
using deadly force, other than for self-defense purposes, there must be probable cause
that the suspect 'poses a threat of serious physical harm,' and the deadly force must be
'necessary to prevent escape."' (internal citations omitted)); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho,
The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (2003).
236. Possible measures include moving back (retreat), mollifying the fist (negotia-
tion), getting into a boxers crouch (self-defense), or waiting (passive, non-resistance).
237. Through human sources (HUMINT), intercepted conversations (SIGINT), or
open sources such as newspapers. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
238. See Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggres-
sor's Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 882-84 (2004); Re'em Segev, Fair-
ness, Responsibility and Self-Defense, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 383, 454-56 (2005).
239. See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Lessons of Anglo-Saxon 'Justice,' 2 GREEN BAG 2D
251, 255 (1999) (alluding to the Wild West as a time where "sheriffs administered a
rough justice"); Joel C. Dobris, Federal Transfer Taxes: The Possibility of Repeal and the
Post Repeal World, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 709, 719 (2000) (alluding to an unrestrained
Wild West saloon); Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58
MERCER L. REV. 919, 933 (2007) (alluding to the "unrestrained frontier justice in the
lawless Wild West").
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"lashing out"-either in advance of an assumed attack or in response to an
attack-is counterproductive, both in the long and short term.
Conversely, the Wyatt Earp paradigm reflects action predicated on a
checklist 2 40 that reflects a self-defense model more in accordance with how
nation-states should conduct operational counterterrorism. Adoption of
the Earp model limits state action. Rather than engaging blindly and
wildly, the knowledge-based paradigm is predicated on intelligence infor-
mation. However, it is also the antithesis of acting only when hit. That is
not a model that the nation-state can adopt from any perspective.
In response to al-Qaeda's attack on American embassies in
Tanzania 24 1 and Kenya, 24 2 President Clinton ordered the bombing of what
was believed to be a chemical-making factory in the Sudan. 24 3 President
Clinton based his authorization both on the need to have a response to the
attack and on intelligence information. 24 4 Subsequent reports, however,
suggested that the intelligence was inaccurate. 245 The building in question
was not a chemical-making factory; rather it housed a pharmaceutical
company. 246
Would adoption of the strict-scrutiny test have prevented this intelli-
gence and political failure? Would the strict-scrutiny test have saved the
life of the Moroccan waiter? The answer is not necessarily yes, but it would
have enabled decisionmakers in both of these situations to ask questions
that they were either not considering or not responding to in a satisfactory
manner. Those questions were not asked either because relevant deci-
sionmakers did not know or did not want to ask them, or because the rele-
vant intelligence community chose not to fill the gap of knowledge. 24 7
C. The Legs
The four legs of the strict-scrutiny test are (1) the United States has a
fundamental right to engage in active self-defense; 248 (2) the nation-state's
240. Whether Mr. Earp knowingly and consciously acted in accordance with a
"check-list" is not important. Relevant to this discussion is his adoption of what the
author refers to as "knowledge-based action" rather than "assumption-based action."
241. On August 7, 1998, nine people were killed and over seventy were wounded.
Jane Perlez, Investigators in Tanzania Study Videocamera and Water Truck Belonging to the
Embassy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at A8.
242. On August 8, 1998, 190 people were killed, and over 5,000 wounded. Tim Wei-
ner, Experts Starting Search for Clues in Kenya Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1998, at Al.
243. See Bennet, supra note 208, at Al.
244. See Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 212, at 142-45 (discussing whether state-based
action solely in response to acts of terrorism is a violation of international law).
245. See Myers & Weiner, supra note 213, at Al.
246. See Johnston, supra note 213, at A2; Risen &Johnston, supra note 213, at A3.
247. See Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
2005, at A31 ("It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are being filled by ad
hoc initiatives.").
248. The criminal and constitutional law sections were intended to lay the ground-
work for a discussion-by analogy and extrapolation-of this right. See supra Parts Il,
IV. The criminal law cases cited and analyzed and the discussion regarding the Second
Amendment addressed the individual's right to engage in self-defense. See supra Part IV.
Although the individual is not the state, this discussion is still important because it
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primary responsibility is to protect the safety and welfare of its citizens;24 9
(3) operational counterterrorism must be predicated on the rule of law, 250
morality in armed conflict, 25 1 and effective policy; 252 and (4) actionable
intelligence must be more than reliable, viable, and corroborated-it must
meet a test of admissibility to a court of law.2 5 3
Let us examine and then apply each leg to operational reality. 25 4 The
ultimate question is when and under what circumstances may the nation-
state act in accordance with lawful self-defense. In advocating the strict-
scrutiny test, the effort is to objectify the process by establishing clear crite-
ria. To do so, one must examine each leg individually and then jointly.
The guiding premise is that according to the so-called "earlier in time" stan-
dard, nation-states can protect themselves based on intelligence informa-
tion-provided the information meets the admissibility test.
The fundamental right to self-defense is inherent to constitutional,
criminal, and international law.25 5 The Second Amendment confers an
individual right to possess a weapon for private self-defense in the
home.2 56 Criminal law sets the rules for when an individual may act in
justifiable self-defense. 2 57 By extrapolation, the individual's right to self-
defense can be seen as transferable to the state. In any event, international
law clearly articulates self-defense criteria-from the Caroline Doctrine, to
Article 51, to the UN resolutions ratified in the aftermath of 9/11.
The nation-state's fundamental responsibility to protect its citizenry
provides a foundation for the larger issue of when a nation-state can defend itself. Many
of the philosophical underpinnings are therefore similar and highly applicable.
249. See Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 293, 308-14 (2000) (tracing the con-
cept of juris ad vitae- the focus on the "state's affirmative responsibility to protect its
citizens both at home and abroad from lethal force" -through history and applying it to
the present day).
250. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., The Rule of Law, Terrorism, and Countermeasures
Including the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 43, 47-49 (2004); E.J. Flynn, The
Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
371, 374-4.78 (2007); Jonathan Hafetz, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Legacy of
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25, 25-27 (2007).
251. See generally Tom Gerety, The War Difference: Law and Morality in Counter-Ter-
rorism, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 147 (2005); Mark D. Keilsgard, A Human Rights Approach to
Counter-Terrorism, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 249 (2006).
252. Effectiveness is a term that policy and decisionmakers prefer avoiding because
its use requires a definition. To contribute to the debate, the author suggests the follow-
ing definition: operational counterterrorism is effective if the terrorist infrastructure suf-
fers serious damage, thereby preventing a particular, planned attack from going forth
and postponing or impacting plans for future attacks.
253. See infra Part VI.D for a discussion on admissibility.
254. Operational reality is a term of art that reflects an understanding that decisions
(made by either commanders or decisionmakers) affect numerous lives (soldiers and
civilians alike) and that death is figuratively around the corner. Cf. William S. Geimer,
Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 275
(1991) (discussing "operational reality" in the death penalty context).
255. See supra Parts 11I, IV, V.
256. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2799, 2821-22 (2008).
257. See supra Part IV.
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goes to the essence of self-defense.2 58 Although that obligation is funda-
mental, it is not absolute-the potential harm to an additional protected
class must be taken into consideration. 25 9 That additional, protected class
is not a legitimate target and the state must provide it reasonable protec-
tions. The operational impact or significance of the obligation regarding a
protected class is an inherent limitation on power. 260 Although the ptotec-
tion of its citizens is the nation-state's primary obligation, it is not the sole
obligation.26 1 How that requisite balance is attained is critical to opera-
tional counterterrorism subject to the rule of law and morality in armed
conflict. 2 62
The strict-scrutiny test contributes to achieving this balance by requir-
ing objective criteria prior to operational action. In advocating strict scru-
tiny prior to operationalizing intelligence information, the emphasis is on
striking a balance between powerful and legitimate obligations. Ahron
Barak's theory requires that both categories must be equally protected. 26 3
That obligation, on the one hand, limits operational counterterrorism and,
on the other hand, advocates greater operational counterterrorism.
Strict scrutiny allows a nation-state to act earlier against an unpro-
tected category of legitimate targets, provided the intelligence information
meets admissibility standards. In the context of the duality suggested by
protected classes, application of the test suggests that greater protection
will be offered to both protected classes while more effectively and target-
ing unprotected, legitimate targets.
Application of the strict-scrutiny test enables the nation-state to meet
the four international law principles -collateral damage, proportionality,
military assistance, and alternatives-that are the center of the laws of
war.2 64 Proper application of these four principles also contributes to, but
does not guarantee, that the nation-state will more successfully win the
support of its citizens. By enabling the nation-state to act earlier than
articulated in the three international law standards- Caroline Doctrine, 26 5
Article 51,266 and UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373 2 67 -but subjecting it to
rules governing the admissibility of evidence, the strict-scrutiny test allows
nation-states to act in accordance with these four international principles.
Although the four principles are intended to govern the relationship
between the state and protected civilians in the context of armed con-
258. See, e.g., Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral
Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 445 (2002).
259. See Barak, supra note 41, at 39.
260. Aharon Barak's theory, self-imposed restraint, goes to the essence of this
dilemma. See generally id.
261. See id. at 38-39.
262. See id. at 39.
263. See id.
264. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part V.A.
266. See supra Part V.B.
267. See supra Part V.C.
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flict,268 they also lay the foundation for the relationship between the state
and individuals otherwise unprotected. In laying the foundation for this
relationship, these four principles represent the limits of power by confin-
ing nation-state action to an unprotected class. 269 That is, the four princi-
ples control on how far, and when, the nation-state can protect itself. To
that end, the strict-scrutiny test respects that limitation while facilitating
broader, yet more precise, state action. Rather than violating those four
principles, application of the strict-scrutiny test would ensure greater
respect for international law. Perhaps, the factory bombing of the Clinton
administration best exemplifies the merits of the strict-scrutiny test. 270 By
not subjecting the available intelligence to principles governing admissibil-
ity of evidence in a courtroom, a pharmaceutical company rather than
chemical-making plant was targeted. 27 1 Some may argue that operational
errors are inevitable; 272 however, while combat inherently involves-if not
invites-mistakes and tragedy, the nation-state is obligated to minimize
such occurrences.
Decisionmakers must have standards to know if the available intelli-
gence indeed justifies state action. The objectification of counterterrorism
predicated on a process seeks to develop standards that will lead directly to
more measured, and therefore effective, operational decisions. To develop
an appropriate and practical process, the intelligence-operational world
must be made clear. That world is comprised of case officers, terrorists,
decisionmakers' legal advisors, and operators who engage the terrorist. It
is a complicated community; the stakes are extraordinarily high because
wrong decisions result in innocent deaths. Hesitation to "pull the trigger"
may simultaneously spare the life of a terrorist while directly contributing
to the death of an innocent civilian. Wrong identification also results in
the death of innocent individuals. 27 3  Therefore, the strict-scrutiny
approach suggests supremacy of intelligence information and the require-
ment that intelligence information meet admissibility standards.
To wit, in requesting permission to "shoot to kill," let us consider the
following scenario where the commander is presented these facts: Accord-
ing to the intelligence community, an individual dressed in a certain man-
268. See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield:
Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High
Ground, 56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 92-95 (2005). See generally, William Bradford, Barbarians at
the Gates: A Post-September 11 th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 Miss. LJ. 639
(2004).
269. See Richard John Galvin, The ICC Prosecutor, Collateral Damage and NGOS: Eval-
uating the Risk of a Politicized Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1, 46-48
(2005); J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompany-
ing the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 182-85 (2005).
270. See supra notes 208-211 and accompanying text.
271. See Johnston, supra note 213, at A2.
272. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391, 400 (1993); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1,
174 (1990); W. Hays Parks, Lessons from the 1986 Libya Airstrike, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV.
755, 761 (2002).
273. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 225-226.
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ner and carrying a particular bag would-if not killed-present a grave
threat to national security. The operational window of opportunity availa-
ble to the commander was limited to a few minutes. Troops had been stra-
tegically placed in a ready position. The individual in question walked like
and carried a bag similar to the presented intelligence information, but
uncertainty remained as to whether he was the person in question. That
was the dilemma the author faced when called by the commander. In prep-
aration for such a request, the author had developed a checklist of ques-
tions for those seeking authorization for such decisions. Those questions
consisted of the following prying clarifications:
1) Who was the source of the intelligence information (in an effort
to ascertain reliability and viability)?
2) What were the alternatives to killing the individual (why could he
not be arrested)?
3) How significant was the risk presented?
4) Would collateral damage be minimized?
5) Did the individual have known prior affiliation with terrorist
groups?
6) Was the commander convinced that the individual fit the intelli-
gence profile?
7) Had the commander directly spoken to the case officer or had the
information been relayed?
8) What weapons were available to the commander (for example:
nighttime vision)?
9) Was the intelligence information corroborated?
10) Did the commander believe the intelligence information?
These questions are similar to those asked when evaluating a nation-
state's fundamental right to self-defense and the legitimacy of operational
counterterrorism. But, just as importantly, these questions reflect a refusal
to allow the killing of an individual solely based on what was reported to
the commander regarding the content of a conversation between the source
and the case officer. The risks are too great for one to answer these ques-
tions affirmatively based only on limited facts or information. In correlat-
ing this dilemma to the criminal law process, similar questions can be
insightful:
1) When does the prosecutor have enough evidence to submit an
indictment?
2) What evidence meets tests of admissibility (substantively and
procedurally)?
3) What evidence raises doubt as to guilt?
4) What evidence meets probable cause standards?
5) What evidence justifies conviction?
While tile criminal law process relies on a separation of powers, with
the prosecutor representing the executive branch and the judge the judici-
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ary,2 74 operational counterterrorism is on its face devoid of legislative over-
sight or judicial review. Although the executive prefers to operate in a
vacuum, the question of whether that method most effectively ensures
effective operational counterterrorism remains open. In discussing opera-
tion counterterrorism, it is important to note the advantage of institutional-
ized, process-based input into executive action prior to implementing a
decision.
This institutionalized, process-driven approach is the intellectual back-
bone of the strict-scrutiny test. Rather than relying on the Executive
branch to make decisions in a world devoid of oversight and review, the
strict-scrutiny test suggests that although the nation-state can act earlier
than presently allowed, the intelligence information justifying the pro-
posed action must be submitted to a court to ascertain the information's
admissibility. The discussion before the court would necessarily be con-
ducted ex parte; however, the process of preparing and submitting available
intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to mini-
mizing operational error that otherwise would occur.
D. The Answer: FISA
The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than it might
seem-the court before whom the executive would submit the evidence is
the FISA Court.275 Presently, FISA Court judges weigh the reliability of
intelligence information in determining whether to grant government ex
parte requests for wiretapping warrants. 27 6 Under this proposal, judicial
approval is necessary before the executive can undertake a counterterror-
ism operation predicated solely on intelligence information. The standard
the court would adopt in determining the information's reliability is the
same standard applied in the traditional criminal law paradigm. The intel-
ligence must be reliable, material, and probative. 277 Although the model is
different from the traditional criminal law paradigm-i.e. a defense attor-
ney cannot question state witnesses-the court would assume a dual role.
The court would both cross-examine the representative of the intelligence
community and subsequently rule as to the information's admissibility.
Although some may suggest that the FISA Court is largely an exercise in
rubber stamping, the importance of the proposal is in requiring the govern-
ment to present the available information to an independent judiciary as a
274. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REv. 989 (2006); Kenneth L. Wainstein, Comment, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A
Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76
CAL. L. REv. 727 (1988).
275. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1829 (2000). The For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court created under FISA is composed of seven federal
district court judges from across the United States; the judges are appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. See The Online Newshour, Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance, PBS, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepthcoverage/terrorism/
homeland/fisa.html [hereinafter Foreign Intelligence Surveillance].
276. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, supra note 275.
277. See Schmitt, supra note 15, at 747-48.
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precursor to engaging in operational counterterrorism. 278
In ruling on the information's "admissibility," the court would be
authorized to order the government to provide additional intelligence prior
to approving the request. 27 9 While the proposal explicitly calls for chang-
ing the nature of the relationship between the Executive and the Judicial
branches of the government, it would serve to minimize intelligence-based
mistakes in operational counterterrorism. To ensure enforcement, a presi-
dent that acts in contravention to the FISA court's ruling could be liable for
committing a crime and possibly an impeachable offense.
This proposal does not limit the nation-state's fundamental right to
self-defense. Rather, it creates a process that seeks to objectify counterter-
rorism by establishing standards for determining whether intelligence
information is admissible. By imposing guidelines from the criminal law
paradigm, the strict-scrutiny standard imposes process where, by nature
and de facto, it does not.
Precisely because terrorism, and therefore counterterrorism, are
endemic to future generations, it is necessary to rethink how operational
counterterrorism is conducted. The inherent right to self-defense must be
tempered with recognition of the limits on power. The strict-scrutiny test,
which enables governments to act earlier than envisioned in the three
existing paradigms-Caroline Doctrine, Article 51 or post-9/11 Security
Council resolutions 2 8 0-recognizes that fundamental right. To assist deci-
sionmakers to more effectively meet their obligations with respect to two
separate protected classes, the strict-scrutiny test proposes imposing pro-
cess on operational counterterrorism.
Conclusion
This article has sought to both articulate the dissonance between mod-
ern-day armed conflict (state against non-state actors) and existing inter-
national law and to propose a viable solution. While international law
establishes the right to state self-defense, it is inherently lacking in deter-
mining when a nation-state may engage in preemptive or anticipatory
action. The strict-scrutiny approach to self-defense proposed here would
allow a nation-state to act earlier-provided that the Executive branch can
present reliable, viable, valid, and corroborated intelligence to a FISA Court
prior to undertaking a preemptive operational counterterrorism measure.
Although opponents of the proposed paradigm may perceive it as limiting
the executive's discretion, the diametric opposite is the case. The approach
promotes institutionalizing preemptive operational counterterrorism by
278. See Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHics J. 81,
95 (2003). See generally James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Time
for Reappraisal, 24 INT'L LAW. 1043 (1990).
279. This article does not propose to quantify the amount of intelligence that will be
enough for the FISA court to sign off on, because there is no practical answer to that
question.
280. See supra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
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expanding when the nation-state may act, subject to judicial authorization.
It does so by recommending the adoption of a process necessary to ensure
lawful responses to terrorism and thereby legitimizing counterterrorism
efforts.
